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A COURT FOR THE ONE PERCENT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
CONTRIBUTES TO ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
Michele Gilman*

This Article explores the United States Supreme Court’s role in
furthering economic inequality. The Occupy Wall Street movement in
2011 not only highlighted growing income and wealth inequality in the
United States, but also pointed the blame at governmental policies that
favor business interests and the wealthy due to their outsized influence
on politicians. Numerous economists and political scientists agree with
this thesis. However, in focusing ire on the political branches and big
business, these critiques have largely overlooked the role of the judiciary
in fostering economic inequality. The Court’s doctrine touches each of
the major causes of economic inequality, which includes systemic
failures of our educational system, a frayed social safety net, probusiness
policies at the expense of consumers and employees, and the growing
influence of money in politics. In each of these areas, the Court’s
deference to legislative judgments is highly selective and driven by a
class-blind view of the law that presumes that market-based results are
natural, inevitable, and beneficial. For instance, the Court rejects
government attempts to voluntarily desegregate schools, while deferring
to laws that create unequal financing for poor school districts. The end
result is that poor children receive subpar educations, dooming many of
them to the bottom of the economic spectrum. Similarly, the Court
overturned Congress’s attempt to rein in campaign financing, while
upholding state voter identification laws that suppress the votes of the
poor. These decisions distort the electoral process in favor of the wealthy.
In short, the Court tends to defer to laws that create economic inequality,
while striking down legislative attempts to level the playing field. While a
popular conception of the Court is that it is designed to protect
vulnerable minorities from majoritarian impulse, the Court, instead, is
helping to protect a very powerful minority at the expense of the majority.
This Article is one step toward understanding how law intertwines with
politics and economics to create economic inequality.
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INTRODUCTION
“You can have democracy in this country, or you can have great
wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but you cannot have both.”
Louis Brandeis, Supreme Court Justice 1
The Occupy Wall Street protests that ignited on September 17, 2011, and
flared throughout the fall and winter of 2011 may have flickered out, but Occupy
Wall Street (OWS) and its call for greater economic fairness had a lasting impact.2
With its slogan of “We are the 99%,” 3 OWS changed the national conversation
about economic inequality. OWS shined a spotlight on the fact that the top 1% of
households currently earns one-fifth of the nation’s income, 4 while owning over
one-third of the nation’s wealth. 5 Meanwhile, incomes for the other 99% are at
their lowest point since 1997, and these Americans face less social mobility, rising
unemployment, and job insecurity. 6 Simultaneously, poverty rates have increased,
and nearly one-third of all Americans have either fallen into poverty or live on
earnings that classify them as low income. 7 These sobering facts undermine our
1

MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 1 (2012) (quoting Justice Brandeis).
2
See James Miller, Is Democracy Still in the Streets?, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK
173, 174 (Janet Byrne & Robin Wells eds., 2012).
3
Stephen Gandel, The Leaders of a Leaderless Movement, in WHAT IS OCCUPY?
INSIDE THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT 34, 35 (Time Home Entm’t, Inc. ed., 2011).
4
Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United
States 3, 8 (Mar. 2, 2012), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes2010.pdf (updated with 2009 and 2010 estimates) (updating the original version of
Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States,
PATHWAYS MAG., Winter 2008, at 6–7).
5
See Sylvia A. Allgretto, The State of Working America’s Wealth 2011: Through
Volatility and Turmoil the Gap Widens 4 (Econ. Pol’y Inst., Briefing Paper No. 292, 2011),
available at http://epi.3cdn.net/2a7ccb3e9e618f0bbc_3nm6idnax.pdf; Edward N. Wolff,
Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising Debt and the MiddleClass Squeeze—an Update to 2007, at 11 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper
No. 589, 2010), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_589.pdf.
6
See JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS
2–4 (2010) (describing impacts on the middle class); BENJAMIN I. PAGE & LAWRENCE R.
JACOBS, CLASS WAR? 6 (2009) (noting that middle and lower income groups have faced
wage losses and stagnation, while high-income earners have seen wage hikes); Rajan
Reghuram, Inequality and Intemperate Policy, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2,
at 79, 80.
7
The official poverty rate in 2011 was 15%. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES:
2011, at 13 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf.
Twenty-eight percent of the population fell into poverty for at least two months between
2009 and 2010, although chronic spells of poverty lasting over twenty-four months were
uncommon at 4.8%. Id. at 4. One-third of Americans had income below 200% of the
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vision of America as a meritocracy, where people get what they deserve through
hard work and initiative.
The OWS movement contends that this widening economic gap results from a
tainted political system in which the government hands out tax breaks, bail outs,
and other financial advantages to banks, business enterprises, and the super rich
due to their outsized influence on politicians. 8 OWS echoes prominent economists
and political scientists who assert that rising economic inequality is not solely the
result of market forces, but also government policies. Yet, in focusing its ire on the
political branches and big business, these critiques have largely overlooked the role
of the judiciary in upholding laws and legal principles that foster inequality. After
all, politicians pass laws, but courts uphold them. Accordingly, this Article
examines the role of the Supreme Court in interpreting laws that impact economic
inequality.
Economists have identified at least four major factors contributing to the
sharp rise in economic inequality since the 1980s, although there is disagreement
about the weight and significance of these factors. First, our educational system is
not producing students with the skills to succeed in a technologically based
economy in which low-skill jobs have been replaced by computers or moved
overseas due to globalization. 9 Second, we have a frayed social safety net with
limited redistribution to people at the bottom of the economic ladder. 10 Third, our

poverty threshold, which is considered low income. Id. at 17–18. Many of these families
are working; “in 2011, more than 7 in 10 low-income families and half of all poor families
were working. They simply did not earn enough money to pay for basic living expenses.”
BRANDON ROBERTS ET AL., LOW-INCOME WORKING FAMILIES: THE GROWING ECONOMIC
GAP 3 (2013), available at http://www.workingpoorfamilies.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/
01/Winter-2012_2013-WPFP-Data-Brief.pdf.
8
See Geoff Colvin, Are the Bankers to Blame?, in WHAT IS OCCUPY?, supra note 3,
at 64, 64–65; Nouriel Roubini, Economic Insecurity and Inequality Breed Political
Instability, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 150, 150–151.
9
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME
BETWEEN 1979 AND 2007, at 13 (2011) [hereinafter CBO REPORT]; FRANK LEVY &
RICHARD J. MURNANE, THE NEW DIVISION OF LABOR: HOW COMPUTERS ARE CREATING
THE NEXT JOB MARKET 1, 1–2 (2004); David H. Autor et al., Trends in U.S. Wage
Inequality: Revising the Revisionists, 90 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 300, 310 (2008);
Inequality and Skills, CHI. BOOTH IGM FORUM (Jan. 25, 2012, 9:13 AM), http://www.igm
chicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_0IAlhdDH2FoRDrm
(noting that over 80% of economic experts agreed that technological change was a cause of
economic inequality).
10
See Timothy Smeeding, Public Policy, Economic Inequality and Poverty: The
United States in Comparative Perspective, 86 SOC. SCI. QUART. 955, 969 (2005) (arguing
that one reason the United States has greater income inequality than other developed
nations is a weaker income support system); see also Barbara Ehrenreich & John
Ehrenreich, The Making of the American 99 Percent and the Collapse of the Middle Class,
in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 300, 304 (explaining that the middle class is
vulnerable to economic dislocation because the welfare safety net is so limited).
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public policies favor business interests over consumers and employees. 11 Fourth,
these probusiness policies are shaped by the growing influence of money in
politics and a corresponding disengagement from the political process by middleand low-income citizens. 12
Suffice to say, there are hundreds of Supreme Court decisions that touch upon
these political and economic trends, and given the wide array of substantive law
that is implicated, not all of the cases follow the same narrative. Nevertheless, in
each of these four areas, Court doctrine has reinforced economic inequality.
Pulling back and taking a broad view of the Court’s rulings in these areas helps
identify patterns in the Court’s decision making that might otherwise appear
isolated. In brief, the Court’s deference to legislative judgments is highly selective
and driven by a class-blind view of the law. Sometimes, the Court defers to
government laws and policies that harm the economic interests of the 99%. Other
times, the Court rejects legislative attempts to redistribute societal benefits, while
presuming that market-based results are natural, inevitable, and beneficial. Either
way, the outcome is bad for economic equality. For instance, the Court rejects
government attempts to voluntarily desegregate schools, while deferring to laws
that result in unequal financing for rich and poor school districts. The end result is
that poor children receive subpar educations, dooming many of them to the bottom
of the economic spectrum. Similarly, the Court rejected Congress’s attempt to rein
in campaign financing, while upholding state voter identification laws that
suppress the votes of the poor. These decisions distort the electoral process in favor
of the wealthy.
While a popular conception of the Court is that it is designed to protect
vulnerable minorities at the hands of majoritarian impulse, the Court, instead, is
helping to protect a very powerful minority at the expense of the majority. This
Article is one step toward understanding how law intertwines with politics and
economics to create economic inequality. Part I describes the rise of economic
inequality since the 1970s and identifies the main causes for this divergence, each
of which is linked to governmental policies. Part II analyzes how Supreme Court
doctrine has reinforced economic inequality in the areas of education,
redistribution, corporate law, and the political process. This Part examines the
reasoning underlying the Court’s doctrine and reveals that the Court ignores the
connection between government policies and inequality and defers to market-based
outcomes as “natural” and desirable. Part III explores reasons why the Supreme
Court maintains its class-blind view of the law in the face of economic reality to
the contrary. It explains why the Justices, who are not subject to the corrupting
influence of money in politics, nevertheless favor the interests of the 1%. Part III
concludes by suggesting ways that progressive lawyers can work to reform law in
order to create greater economic equality.

11

See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY 34–37 (2012) (discussing how
policies are more favorable to business).
12
See infra Parts II.B, II.D.
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I. ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND OWS
A. The Rise of Economic Inequality
We are living in an era of rising income inequality, driven by rapid growth in
income among the top 1% of our income distribution. 13 These Americans currently
earn one-fifth of the nation’s income, 14 or put differently, in one week, the top 1%
earn more than the bottom one-fifth earn in a year. 15 Income is superconcentrated
at the pinnacle of the scale, where “the top [0.1%] received in a day and a half
about what the bottom 90[%] received in a year.” 16 Meanwhile, wages for most
Americans have stagnated. 17 While the top 1% saw their after-tax household
income grow by 275% between 1979 and 2007, the middle of the income
distribution had only a 40% increase, and the bottom 20% had an abysmal 18%
increase. 18 Even as the country slowly emerges from the 2007 recession and its
aftereffects, the top 1% is outpacing everyone else; they have amassed 93% of the
income gains between 2009 and 2010. 19 Wealth inequality is even starker. 20 The
top 1% own “more than a third of the nation’s wealth” 21 or “225 times the wealth
of the typical American,” a ratio that is double what it was in both 1962 and
1983. 22

13

See CBO REPORT, supra note 9, at xi (providing statistics to show that income rose
much more for households at the higher end of the income scale than those in the middle
and lower end of the income scale).
14
See TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE 147 (2012); STIGLITZ, supra note 11,
at 2; see also Saez, supra note 4, at 3.
15
See STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 4. There are “two core facts” at play, according to
James K. Galbraith, “rapidly growing pay in a few small high-paid sectors, and growing
employment in a few large but low-paid sectors.” James K. Galbraith, INEQUALITY AND
INSTABILITY: A STUDY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY JUST BEFORE THE GREAT CRISIS 135
(2012).
16
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 4; see also HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 3
(noting that the top .1% “received over 20[%] of all after-tax income gains between 1979
and 2005, compared with the 13.5[%] enjoyed by the bottom 60[%] of households”).
17
See PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 6 (describing the wages of low- and middlewage earners as falling or stagnating).
18
CBO REPORT, supra note 9, at ix.
19
Saez, supra note 4, at 1. Income inequality grew between 2010 and 2011, which is
the first annual increase since 1993. DENAVAS-WALT, supra note 7, at 10.
20
On the significance of wealth inequality and how it differs from income inequality,
see generally James B. Davies, Wealth and Economic Inequality, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 127, 127–49 (Wiemer Salverda et al. eds., 2009).
21
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 2.
22
Id. at 2, 8; see also PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 7–9 (describing the gap
between the top 1% and the bottom 90%).

2014]

A COURT FOR THE ONE PERCENT

395

In short, the inequality gap has grown since 1975 to levels not seen since the
Roaring Twenties. 23 By contrast, during the thirty years that followed World War
II, “America grew together,” 24 and income distributions were stable, 25 largely as a
result of government policies such as the GI bill, which sent veterans to college, a
progressive tax system, 26 and a strong labor movement. 27 Thirty years ago, the top
1% earned 12% of the nation’s income. 28 Today, it is 21%. 29
B. The Causes of Economic Inequality
OWS contends that this rising economic inequality results from government
policies that aid the super wealthy and businesses due to the outsized influence of
money in the political process. 30 There is ample social science and economic
research to support this thesis. 31 Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz
argues that inequality is not solely the result of market forces; rather, “government
policies have been central to the creation of inequality in the United States.” 32
Economist Rebecca Blank concurs, noting that “the political system shapes
economic outcomes.” 33 Political scientist Larry Bartels similarly states that
“politics . . . profoundly shapes economics,” 34 and overlooking this connection
“discourages systematic critical scrutiny of” inequality. 35 Political scientists Jacob

23

PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 7; see also Frank Levy & Peter Temin, Inequality
and Institutions in 20th Century America 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 13106, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13106.pdf?new_windo
w=1 (describing the increase in income inequality from 1980 to 2005).
24
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 4; see also LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY
8–9 (2008) (“the real incomes of working poor families . . . and affluent families . . . both
grew by the same 98%” from the late 1940s through the early 1970s).
25
See CBO REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (describing the income concentration
following World War II as unchanged).
26
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 5.
27
NOAH, supra note 14, at 21.
28
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 4.
29
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 4; PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 7.
30
See Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Against Political Capture: Occupiers,
Muckrakers, Progressives, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 100, 110
(explaining that OWS protesters recognize that the wealthy have control over political
agendas and policies); see also Jeffrey D. Sachs, Occupy Global Capitalism, in THE
OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 462, 473 (summarizing the demands of the
movement).
31
See NOAH, supra note 14, at 6–7 (describing the body of academic work studying
the rise in income inequality).
32
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 6.
33
REBECCA BLANK, CHANGING INEQUALITY 12 (2011) (Blank is currently the acting
Secretary of Commerce.).
34
BARTELS, supra note 24, at 2.
35
Id. at 29–30.
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Hacker and Paul Pierson affirm this assessment, stating, “[g]overnment rules make
the market, and they powerfully shape how, and in whose interests, it operates.” 36
A major factor driving inequality is the rise of pretax income for the top 1%, 37
due in part to government action and inaction with regard to labor laws, finance,
and corporate compensation. 38 As Stiglitz explains, government sets the rules of
the game by establishing the playing field for unionization, corporate governance,
and competition laws. 39 Union membership, which is correlated nationally and
internationally to higher wages for the middle class, is only 12% of the total
workforce, compared to 21% in 1979. 40 Furthermore, the middle class is shrinking
as better paying jobs disappear. Technology and globalization have reduced the
number of moderate and low-skilled jobs, pushing those workers into the lowpaying service sector, while creating jobs for highly skilled, educated workers. 41
Yet, America is not producing enough college graduates to keep up with the
change, and the government is doing little to hold down college tuitions that make
higher education out of reach for many middle-class and lower-income families. 42
Moreover, the government has not reined in market failures that have led to
excessive rent seeking by large corporations. 43 For instance, the federal government failed to regulate derivatives, banks then benefited from a lack of
transparency in their sale, and the market was deprived of information and
36

HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 44; see also DAVID BRADY, RICH
DEMOCRACIES, POOR PEOPLE: HOW POLITICS EXPLAIN POVERTY 6 (2009) (a sociologist
explains that “the distribution of resources in states and markets is inherently political”).
37
See CBO REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 (summarizing a study that computed Gini
indexes using before-tax, after-tax measure of household cash); NOAH, supra note 14, at
113 (noting the “stunning increase in pretax income share for the wealthiest Americans”
not as a result of direct government redistribution, but indirect government intervention as
a result of “institutions and norms”); PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 5–7 (comparing
inequality in “take home pay” as one factor contributing to the remaking of the overall
distribution of income).
38
See STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 65 (arguing that strong worker protections could
correct an imbalance in economic power).
39
Id. at 57–58.
40
NOAH, supra note 14, at 127 (noting that union membership is now only 7% of the
private sector workforce).
41
Id. at 77; STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 54.
42
See NOAH, supra note 14, at 89; STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 55–56; Alice Karekezi,
What Caused the Wealth Gap?, SALON (Oct. 11, 2011, 9:40 AM), http://www.salon.com/2
011/10/11/what_caused_the_wealth_gap (Jeffrey Sachs explaining that low social and
economic mobility stems from the difficulty of obtaining an advanced degree, and thus a
good position in the economy, if one’s parents do not have an advanced degree).
43
See STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 34, 39–51 (describing the financial sector as using
“its political muscle to make sure that the market failures were not corrected”); Levy &
Temin, supra note 23, at 6 (the impacts of technology and trade “are embedded in a larger
institutional story” of post-1980 abandonment of prolabor institutions and deregulation).
Stiglitz defines rent-seeking as “getting income not as a reward to creating wealth but by
grabbing a larger share of the wealth than would otherwise have been produced without
their effort.” STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 32; see also id. at 39–40.
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appropriate regulation. 44 Yet, what the government failed to do on the front end, it
cleaned up on the back end. The political branches deregulated the financial
industry, the market then collapsed, 45 and the government stepped in to bail out the
banks for their own misbehavior. In other words, “[t]he financial world was
reaping the benefit of high-risk, largely unregulated trading while offloading its
losses onto the government.” 46 These “bubble economies,” associated with
massive gains to people at the top of leading sectors are unstable and “are no
longer a plausible way to generate economic growth.” 47
Another high-profile example of corporate rent seeking is exorbitant CEO
compensation; in 2010 the ratio of CEO compensation to that of a typical worker
was 243 to 1. 48 American CEOs earn two to three times more than their European
counterparts. 49 Legislative efforts to rein in executive pay have been weak,
impacted by corporate lobbying. 50 Other forms of rent seeking that government has
failed to restrain and that have contributed to economic inequality include
monopolistic behaviors, 51 predatory lending, 52 government subsidies to business, 53
regulatory capture, 54 and rules that protect companies from foreign competition. 55
Tax policy has also disproportionately benefitted the top 1%. 56 President Reagan
pushed the top tax bracket down from 70% to 28%, and it has stayed between 35%
and 40% since then. 57 The top 1% is not only earning bigger paychecks, but is also
taxed less heavily than they were during the era of economic equality. 58 This
economic inequality is neither inevitable nor natural; rather, government policies
play a role in generating economic inequality.

44

STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 35–36.
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 67–86 (2011); HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 68–70; NOAH,
supra note 14, at 160–62.
46
NOAH, supra note 14, at 186.
47
GALBRAITH, supra note 15, at 148–49.
48
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 3.
49
HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 62–63; NOAH, supra note 14, at 152.
50
HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 64–65, 221.
51
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 43–47
52
Id. at 36–37.
53
Id. at 40; NOAH, supra note 14, at 172 (“Congress was busy extending copyright
terms and patent monopolies and turning over public lands to mining and timber companies
for below-market fees.”).
54
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 47–48.
55
Id. at 50.
56
See id. at 71–74 (discussing how tax policies are less restrictive for the top).
57
NOAH, supra note 14, at 110.
58
See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 48. On January 2, 2013, the President
signed into law a tax increase to 39.6% from 35% on earners over $400,000. American
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013). This law was
enacted to avoid the “fiscal cliff” and represents the success of the President’s rhetoric
about income inequality.
45
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C. The Impacts of Economic Inequality
While conservatives and liberals largely agree that income inequality is on the
rise, 59 they disagree over whether this is a bad thing. Liberals recognize that some
level of economic inequality is an integral part of capitalism but contend that
current levels of inequality—significantly higher than in other advanced,
industrialized, democratic nations—are too extreme. 60 By contrast, for conservatives, inequality is a necessary motivator for citizens to work hard, innovate,
and create wealth. 61 Yet, we are at the point at which the level of inequality is
more than what is needed to maximize output. 62 For most middle-income and lowwage jobs in our economy, effort and skill do not matter; workers are instead
motivated by fear of losing their jobs and becoming destitute. 63
In fact, higher American worker productivity has not led to wage gains for the
middle class; only the top 10% saw their incomes benefit from increases in worker
productivity. 64 It does not appear that the megarich need additional pay as

59

PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 9–10 (“The basic facts about economic inequality
are rock solid. The statistics have been meticulously gathered and analyzed by nonpartisan
economists, respected government agencies, and independent bodies that work closely with
Wall Street firms and private bankers and investors.”); see also NOAH, supra note 14, at 7
(remarking on the consensus among experts).
60
See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 38–40 (demonstrating that the United
States is now the most unequal nation of the advanced industrial countries in terms of the
level and increase of inequality); NOAH, supra note 14, at 3–4, 164–66 (finding that the
United States’ income distribution places it twenty-seventh of thirty OECD nations);
Timothy M. Smeeding, Public Policy, Economic Inequality, and Poverty: The United
States in Comparative Perspective, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 955, 956 (2005) (determining that “the
United States has the highest overall level of inequality of any rich OECD nation in the
mid-1990s”). On comparative income inequality in developed nations, see generally
Andrea Brandolini & Timothy M. Smeeding, Income Inequality in Richer and OECD
Countries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, supra note 20, at 71.
61
See NOAH, supra note 14, at 165–68 (summarizing the views of economists who
endorse this view); STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 106–17 (arguing that the conservatives
believe that inequality motivates people to be more productive and efficient for a better
outcome); Richard B. Freeman, (Some) Inequality is Good for You, in THE NEW GILDED
AGE: THE CRITICAL INEQUALITY DEBATES OF OUR TIME 63, 64–68 (David B. Grusky &
Tamar Kricheli-Katz eds., 2012) (including a list of economists’ arguments supporting
income inequality).
62
See Freeman, supra note 61, at 82 (arguing that “many of the ways in which top
earners make their money in response to incentives are counterproductive”).
63
See NOAH, supra note 14, at 166–67 (arguing that the middle- or low-income
workers are not motivated by goods acquired through skill and effort); STIGLITZ, supra
note 11, at 102–03 (discussing the anxieties faced by the middle of the population).
64
NOAH, supra note 14, at 176; see also BARTELS, supra note 24, at 17–18 (citing
economists’ concept of the “unprecedented dichotomy” between worker output and income
growth as evidence of fairness problems in recent development in United States income
distribution); Levy & Temin, supra note 23, at 2 (holding that between 1980 and 2005,
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motivation to work hard, and moreover, many executive payment methods are
economically inefficient, such as stock options that raise executive pay regardless
of performance. 65 For instance, while amassing huge fortunes prior to the 2008
economic downturn (largely in the financial industry and as corporate executives),
the top .1% arguably was not contributing to society’s bottom line through
technological, scientific, or other innovations that improve life for others. 66 Rather,
in the realm of finance, “it was not contribution to society that determined relative
pay, but something else: bankers received large rewards, though their contribution
to society—and even to their firms—had been negative.” 67 In short, inequality is
not providing the right kind of incentives, and it is skewing the market towards the
top.
Economic inequality injures the economy through “lower productivity, lower
efficiency, lower growth, [and] more instability,” 68 as the top 1% gain a larger
slice of the pie without increasing the size of the pie. By contrast, across nations,
economic equality is associated with longer and more sustained growth. 69 Income
inequality played a role in the 2008 collapse of the market, as middle-class
Americans relied on debt to stay afloat. 70 Large gaps between the rich and the poor
are also associated with a wide array of social dysfunctions, such as higher rates of
infant mortality and crime, less educational attainment, and lower life

business sector productivity increased by 67.4%, yet median weekly earnings of full-time
workers rose only 14%).
65
See Freeman, supra note 61, at 82–83 (“[M]any of the ways in which top earners
make their money in response to incentives are counterproductive . . . .”).
66
See STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at xiv–xv (arguing that the wealth of the elite and
wealthy seemed to arise out of their ability to take advantage of others).
67
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at xv; see also John Cassidy, What Good is Wall Street? in
THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 54, 72 (reviewing studies showing that “people
in the financial sector are overpaid”).
68
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 117.
69
See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS
OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 302–34 (2012); BARTELS, supra note 24, at 14
(“[E]conomists who have studied the relationship between inequality and economic growth
have found little evidence that large disparities in income and wealth promote growth.”);
Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Against Political Capture: Occupiers, Muckrakers,
Progressives, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 100, 107 (“Countries that have
succeeded in creating egalitarian, economically dynamic societies have done so because
they have forged inclusive political institutions.”); Andrew G. Berg & Jonathan D. Ostry,
Equality and Efficiency: Is There a Trade-off Between the Two or Do They Go Hand in
Hand?, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2011, at 13–14; Jonas Pontusson, Inequality and Economic
Growth in Comparative Perspective, in THE NEW GILDED AGE: THE CRITICAL INEQUALITY
DEBATES OF OUR TIME, supra note 61, at 88, 96.
70
See NOAH, supra note 14, at 168–70 (citing scholars who support this point of
view); Berg & Ostry, supra note 69, at 13 (explaining how inequality played a role in the
United States financial crisis).

400

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

expectancy. 71 In turn, these social ills result in lost productivity and increased costs
“associated with containing the violence, healing the sick, and fixing the
dysfunction.” 72 In addition, inequality undermines America’s self-identity and
moral purpose, which are based on ideals of fair play and equal opportunity for
all. 73 Inequality leads to attacks on immigration and resistance to international
trade, both of which might otherwise alleviate some inequality. 74 Meanwhile, the
wealthy become more isolated in gated communities and less willing to spend
money on common needs, while public investments drop in things such as
infrastructure, basic research, and education. 75 These underinvestments lead to
greater inequality, creating a downward spiral, as faith in government erodes.
Given the downsides of inequality, why have the legislative and executive
branches enacted policies that favor the interests of business and the wealthy over
the average American? There are multiple explanations, most of which converge
on growing political polarization and the role of money in politics. The rise of
political polarization and partisanship tracks the rise of income inequality. 76
Republicans favor policies that foster inequality, and they have not only held
control through much of this time period, but their dominance has also pushed
Democrats rightward. 77 Nevertheless, the top 1% have done staggeringly well
through both Republican and Democratic administrations, and neither party is
immune to the need to raise money to obtain and stay in power. 78 Moreover,
studies show that politicians of both parties are most responsive to affluent voters
and ignore the opinions of citizens at the bottom of the income ladder. 79 Through
lobbying and campaign contributions, business interests and wealthy individuals
71

See RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER
EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER 81, 108–13, 134–37 (2009); Richard H. McAdams,
Economic Costs of Inequality, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 37 (2010) (“In sum, though the
empirical connection between inequality and crime is not fully resolved and requires more
study, there is significant evidence that it is real and substantial.”).
72
Michael Shank, Tax Loophole Users, Companies with Negative Tax Rates,
Exacerbating US Income Inequality, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2011, 3:41 PM), http://w
ww.huffingtonpost.com/michael-shank/income-inequality-tax-loopholes_b_1092309.html.
73
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 117; see also PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 46;
BLANK, supra note 33, at 5–6 (addressing the noneconomic impacts of inequality, such as
decreases in voting rate and self-reported happiness).
74
PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 45–46.
75
BARTELS, supra note 24, at 14; STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 93, 289; Greg J. Duncan
& Richard J. Murnane, Introduction: The American Dream, Then and Now, in WHITHER
OPPORTUNITY?: RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES 3, 3, 7–8
(Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011) [hereinafter WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?];
John Ferejohn, Rising Inequality and American Politics, in THE NEW GILDED AGE: THE
CRITICAL INEQUALITY DEBATES OF OUR TIME, supra note 61, at 115, 130.
76
See Ferejohn, supra note 75, at 115, 124–25.
77
See id. at 126–29.
78
See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 163–93 (describing the Democrats’ drift
rightward as the party started courting business to raise money).
79
BARTELS, supra note 24, at 5.
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have been able to secure the policies described above, such as unlimited corporate
compensation, government subsidies, and deregulation. Yet, when such policies
and practices that contribute to economic inequality are challenged in the courts,
the Supreme Court generally upholds them. Accordingly, the next Part places the
Supreme Court within this narrative of the government’s role in creating and
maintaining economic inequality. The judiciary is the missing piece of the
inequality puzzle.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
The major causes of economic inequality all intersect with law and,
specifically, with Supreme Court doctrine. This Part traces how the Supreme Court
has contributed to economic inequality by denying social or economic rights for
people at the bottom of the income scale; favoring the interests of business over
consumers and employees; refusing to recognize a constitutional right to education;
and allowing money to drive the electoral system.
A. Redistribution and the Social Safety Net
The Court adheres to three core principles when it directly confronts issues of
class. First, the Constitution does not create or guarantee social or economic
rights. 80 Second, the poor are not a suspect class, and thus, discrimination on the
basis of wealth does not warrant heightened review. 81 Third, laws that impact the
poor are a type of economic legislation subject to rational basis review. 82 As a
result of these interlocking principles, poor people generally must secure any
governmental assistance through the political process, yet they often fare badly in
the legislative realm due to their lack of political influence and a societal distaste
for and distrust of the poor. “The more generous a welfare state, the more people
are protected from the economic insecurity and instability of markets.” 83
Unfortunately for the poor in America, our welfare state is less egalitarian than in
other developed nations. 84 As political scientists have shown, Congress is entirely
unresponsive to the political preferences of the poor. As a result of the recent
80

See DeShaney v. Winnebego Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)
(holding that there is no constitutional duty to protect children from their abusive parents
after receiving reports of possible abuse).
81
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18–37 (1973) (holding
that invoking strict scrutiny is inappropriate in a class action involving poor families).
82
See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322–25 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 470–72 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18–37 (1973);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487
(1970).
83
BRADY, supra note 36, at 166. The author continues, “The generosity of the welfare
state is the dominant cause of how much poverty exists in affluent Western democracies.”
Id. And, of course, the scope and scale of the welfare state is a matter of politics.
84
Id.
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recession, many formerly middle-class people are falling into poverty, and the
poverty rate is about to surpass rates not seen since the 1960s. 85 The OWS
movement argues that poverty is not inevitable; it cannot be blamed solely on
personal failings; and it results from structural features of the economy that are
reinforced or ignored by government policies. However, in the ideology of the
Supreme Court, government is not responsible for creating poverty and, thus, bears
no obligation to solve it.86
1. The Constitution Does Not Create Social and Economic Rights
The core principle of the Court’s class doctrine is that the Constitution does
not ensure any minimum level of entitlement or standard of living. No one is
constitutionally entitled to food, housing, medical care, or education. 87 As the
Court has stated, “the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the
individual.” 88 In this view, the Constitution creates negative, rather than positive,
rights, meaning that the Constitution protects against government interference of
rights, but it does not create any affirmative obligations on the part of
government. 89 Consistent with these principles, the Court ruled in DeShaney v.
Winnebego County Department of Social Services 90 that the Constitution is not
implicated when the state Department of Social Services turns a child over to an
abusive father after repeated warnings of abuse, and the child is injured as a
result. 91 Nor is the Constitution violated, according to Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 92 when a police department fails to enforce a domestic violence
protective order, thus leading to the murder of a woman’s three children by her
85

See, e.g., Hope Yen, 4 in 5 in USA Face Near-Poverty, No Work, USA TODAY,
Sept. 17, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/07/28/americans-pov
erty-no-work/2594203/ (reporting on an Associated Press survey data that “[t]he risks of
poverty . . . have been increasing in recent decades . . . coinciding with widening income
inequality.”).
86
See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (stating that the government
does not create indigency); Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate
Treatment of Race and Class in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
109, 110–13 (2009) (describing the Court’s unwillingness to compel the government to
improve the difficulties their actions create for the poor).
87
Lindsay, 405 U.S. at 74 (“We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and
sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social
and economic ill.”).
88
DeShaney v. Winnebego Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
89
See generally Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 2271 (1990) (scrutinizing the “negative liberties” of the Constitution and the
discussion of the undesirable consequences of such an approach in decision law).
90
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
91
Id. at 197–200.
92
545 U.S. 748 (2005).
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estranged husband. 93 Notably, both children in the child welfare system and
domestic violence victims are disproportionately poor. 94 In these cases, the Court
views the provision of government services as a privilege, in which citizens must
take what they can get.
This narrative of the negative Constitution is widely accepted, but it is neither
natural nor inevitable. 95 To begin with, the idea that the Constitution does not
create affirmative rights is not textually accurate. There are many provisions of the
Constitution that secure affirmative rights, such as the right to a trial by jury or the
right to equal protection, which requires the “federal government to protect its
citizens in the face of the states’ failure to do so.” 96 Moreover, the action versus
inaction dichotomy is a false one. 97 As the DeShaney and Gonzeles cases show,
government can harm as much by inaction as by action, and this distinction “does
not take into account government’s pervasive influence through regulatory action
and inaction, its displacement of private remedies, and indeed, its monopoly over
some avenues of relief.” 98 While property and contract may look at first blush like
private market rights, in reality, the government creates and protects those rights
93

Id. at 768.
For a discussion of domestic violence victims, see Deborah M. Weissman, The
Personal is Political—and Economic: Rethinking Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV.
387, 415–17 (“[t]he consequences of deindustrialization . . . are . . . associated with
increased domestic violence.”). For further discussion of socioeconomic status of children
in the child welfare system, see Cynthia R. Mabry, Second Chances: Insuring that Poor
Families Remain Intact by Minimizing Socioeconomic Ramifications of Poverty, 102 W.
VA. L. REV. 607, 618–19 (2000) (arguing that cuts in federal benefits to support poor
families has an impact on the number of children adjudged neglected); Dorothy Roberts,
The Ethics of Punishing Indigent Parents, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 161, 163–64 (William C.
Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) (considering the associations between poverty and
child maltreatment); Kristen Shook Slack et al., Understanding the Risks of Child Neglect:
An Exploration of Poverty and Parenting Characteristics, 9 CHILD MALTREATMENT 395,
396–97 (2004) (analyzing different aspects of poverty and child neglect); see generally
DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002)
(contending that child welfare policies address the disproportionate number of black
children in the United States foster system by punishing their parents instead of tackling
poverty’s roots).
95
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212–13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he question
presented by this case is an open one, and our Fourteenth Amendment precedents may be
read more broadly or narrowly depending upon how one chooses to read them. Faced with
the choice, I would adopt a ‘sympathetic’ reading, one which comports with dictates of
fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the province
of judging.”).
96
Bandes, supra note 89, at 2313; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American
Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2005)
(considering various amendments that require an obligation on government).
97
See Bandes, supra note 89, at 2280 (arguing that the difference between action and
inaction is superficial because to “act” is hard to define).
98
Id. at 2283 (footnote omitted).
94
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by providing enforcement mechanisms. 99 Thus, a governmental decision not to act
equals ratification of political choices.
Unlike the United States, the constitutions of many other countries guarantee
social and economic rights. 100 While critics charge that such rights are impossible
and inappropriate for the judiciary to enforce, 101 there are examples where courts
have held such rights justiciable. For instance, in South Africa, the country’s
highest court ruled that the government is obliged to take reasonable measures
within its available resources to achieve progressive realization of the right to
housing. 102 This decision preserved an important role for the judiciary in protecting
vulnerable populations, while respecting the policymaking role of the political
branches.
Our own history reveals a greater commitment to social and economic rights
than prevailing doctrine admits. 103 In the 1960s and 1970s, in particular, there was
a vibrant welfare rights movement and a receptive Court that appeared poised to
recognize social and economic rights. 104 The groundwork was laid in a series of
cases in which the Court ruled that indigence would not limit access to judicial or
electoral processes, which are fundamental aspects of citizenship.105 The Court has
also ruled that states cannot limit welfare benefits to new residents without
violating a constitutional right to travel, and it reaffirmed this principle postwelfare
reform. 106 While these right-to-travel cases are a rare win for the poor, it is notable
99

Sunstein, supra note 96, at 6; see also Bandes, supra note 88, at 2239.
David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 189,
193–96 (2012); Sunstein, supra note 96, at 15–16.
101
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 96, at 15–16 (arguing that social rights would be
unenforceable); Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82
TEXAS L. REV. 1895, 1895–97 (2004) (summarizing the argument that social welfare rights
are unenforceable).
102
Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), at 19
para. 21 (S. Afr.).
103
See William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique, and
Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1827–35 (2001) (summarizing the “social
citizenship tradition” in America).
104
See id. at 1858–67 (describing the goal to eliminate the categorical nature of the
welfare system in the 1960s and 1970s); Sunstein, supra note 96, at 20–21 (providing
examples of cases decided by the Supreme Court that recognize social and economic
rights).
105
See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that
the state must provide the vote free of charge); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(holding that the state must provide counsel to poor people on their first appeal of a
criminal conviction); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that the state must
provide trial transcripts to poor people appealing their criminal convictions); see also
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that the state may not condition appeals
from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent’s ability to pay
record preparation fees).
106
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489
(1999) (affirming this right in the 1990s).
100

2014]

A COURT FOR THE ONE PERCENT

405

that these cases are premised on a view of welfare as a market that should remain
unfettered so that the poor can strike their best deal for survival.
The highwater mark of constitutional protection for the poor came in the case
of Goldberg v. Kelly, 107 in which the Court held that welfare benefits were a form
of property entitled to due process protections. 108 Justice Brennan addressed the
importance of welfare benefits, stating, “[w]elfare, by meeting the basic demands
of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities
that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the
community.” 109 Yet, the promise of due process often fails claimants who usually
lack lawyers to argue appeals, struggle to get to hearings, and cannot take off work
to fight for their benefits. Nevertheless, the Goldberg opinion was vitally important
in recognizing that public assistance “is not mere charity,” but a means for
furthering democratic norms. 110 However, the momentum built by these welfare
rights cases came to a screeching halt when President Nixon appointed four
conservative Justices in 1970. 111
2. The Poor are Not a Suspect Class
After 1970, the Court solidified its position that the poor are not a suspect
class under the Equal Protection Clause, and thus, legislation that discriminates on
the basis of wealth is reviewed under a lenient rational basis standard. A suspect
class is a group of people who have an immutable trait, who suffer from a history
of prejudice and stereotyping, and who lack a political voice. 112 The Court has long
recognized that race, national origin, alienage, and gender are suspect classes, and
as a result, legislation that draws lines on these bases is assessed under a
heightened level of scrutiny. 113 By contrast, without ever fully explaining why, the
107

397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Id. at 262.
109
Id. at 265.
110
Id.
111
See Sunstein, supra note 96, at 20–22. “[I]t does not seem to me too speculative to
suggest that if Humphrey had been elected, social and economic rights, American-style
would have become a part of American constitutional understandings.” Id. at 22.
112
This framework was set forth in the famous footnote 4 of U.S. v. Carolene
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 438–47 (1985) (analyzing these factors with regard to the
disabled); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976) (analyzing these
factors with regard to the elderly); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–87 (1973)
(applying these factors with regard to women).
113
Race and national origin classifications receive strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). Gender classifications are subject to
intermediate scrutiny, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), as are those regarding
nonmarital children, see Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
108
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Court has regularly assumed that the poor do not meet the test for a suspect
class, 114 and it hammered home that point in its abortion funding cases. 115
In Harris v. McRae, 116 the Court upheld Congress’s denial of Medicaid
coverage for medically necessary abortions; the restriction was challenged as
violating equal protection because Medicaid covered other medically necessary
procedures. 117 The Court stated, “this Court has never held that financial need
alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis,” 118
explaining that “although government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its
own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category.” 119 In the Court’s view, an
indigent woman has the same range of options as if Congress had chosen not to
provide health care coverage at all.120 In dissent, Justice Brennan remarked that the
government’s antiabortion policy may have resulted from majoritarian processes,
but it was not foisted on rich and poor alike. Rather, “it imposes that viewpoint
only upon that segment of our society which, because of its position of political
powerlessness, is least able to defend its privacy rights from the encroachments of
state-mandated morality.” 121
The majority’s assertion that government plays no role in creating indigency
is simply wrong, especially in light of the state’s role in tolerating gender
discrimination in the labor market, which depresses women’s wages. 122 The irony
of the decision is the Court’s “failure to see that the inaccessibility of free
abortions, combined with a legal system which does not require employers to grant
maternity leaves, child-care leaves, or a flexible work schedule, creates the very
indigency which prevents women from exercising the choice to have an

114

Julie Nice argues that this is still an open question, as the Supreme Court has never
explained why the poor are not a suspect class. Julie Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever:
Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, and Dialogic Default, 35
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 647 (2008).
115
Bridgette Baldwin, In Supreme Judgment of the Poor: The Role of the United
States Supreme Court in Welfare Law and Policy, 23 WIS. J. OF L. GEND. & SOC’Y 1, 3
(2008) (“While the historical arch from the Civil Rights Era to the present normally
presents a story of expanded liberties and freedoms to the socially disenfranchised, the lens
of the Supreme Court welfare decisions narrates a much different story.”).
116
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
117
Id. at 326.
118
Id. at 323 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470–71 (1977) (holding that the
Equal Protection Clause does not require a state participating in the Medicaid program to
pay the expenses incident to nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women even if it pays
expenses incident to childbirth)).
119
Id. at 316.
120
Id. at 317–18.
121
Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122
See Judith Olans Brown et al., The Failure of Gender Equality: An Essay in
Constitutional Dissonance, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 573, 630 (1987).
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abortion.” 123 As a result of McRae, poor women may forgo necessities, such as
food and rent, to pay for abortions or turn to illegal and unsafe methods of
abortion. 124 A scramble for funds often leads to a delayed abortion, which in turn,
costs more and has higher health risks. 125
Even if we accept the Court’s test for identifying a suspect class (i.e.,
possessing an immutable trait, a history of prejudice and stereotyping, and lack of
political voice), we know far more today about poverty than we did in the 1970s,
and this research suggests that the poor share many of the criteria of a suspect class.
For instance, while poverty is certainly not immutable, intergenerational mobility
is far more limited than our meritocratic myth assumes, as well as lower than in
other countries. “Four out of 10 children whose family is in the bottom fifth
[incomes up to about $25,000] will end up there as adults. Only 6[%] of them will
rise to the top fifth [incomes over $100,000].” 126 In short, who your parents are
largely determines what you will earn in the future. 127 At the same time, our
123

Id.; see also Rhonda Copelon, Losing the Negative Right of Privacy: Building
Sexual and Reproductive Freedom, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 15, 47 (1990–1991)
(ignoring the state’s role in perpetuating poverty “permits the state to escape responsibility
for the tragic conditions of people’s lives and allows it to blame the poor, who are largely
women, for their hardship”).
124
Abortions can cost between $450 in the first trimester to $1,500 and more later in
the pregnancy. See Magda Schaler-Haynes et al., Abortion Coverage and Health Reform:
Restrictions and Options for Exchange-Based Insurance Markets, 15 U. PA. J. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 323, 330 (2012) (discussing the approximate prices of an abortion).
125
Id. at 229 (“Women who delay abortions into the second trimester of pregnancy
are disproportionately people of color and more likely to be lower-income than those who
obtain abortions in the first trimester.”); see also Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterick,
The “Other” Within: Health Care Reform, Class, and the Politics of Reproduction, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377, 395 n.128 (2011–2012) (“In 2001 an abortion obtained at ten
weeks gestation cost $370 on average, by fourteen weeks the cost was $650, and by twenty
weeks it was $1,042) (citing Heather D. Boonstra, The Heart of the Matter: Public Funding
of Abortion for Poor Women in the United States, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 12, 15
(2007)).
126
Eduardo Porter, Inequality Undermines Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/business/economy/tolerance-for-income-gap-may-beebbing-economic-scene.html?_r=0; see also NOAH, supra note 14, at 29 (“Only 6[%] of
Americans born at the bottom of the heap . . . ever make it in adulthood to the top.”);
STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 18–19 (arguing that the chance of moving up in America is
small). Due to the consequences of rising inequality, the “birth lottery” has a higher impact
on mobility today than in past years. See generally Raj Chetty et al., Is the United States
Still a Land of Opportunity?: Trends in Intergenerational Mobility Over 25 Years (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19844, 2014), available at http://ob
s.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/mobility_geo.pdf.
127
BARTELS, supra note 24, at 16 (“[T]he proportion of families in the top quintile of
the income distribution who remained there a decade later also increased, while the
proportion of families falling from the top quintile into the bottom quintile, or from the top
two quintiles into the bottom two quintiles, declined.”); JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN
AMERICA 3, 51 (2003); NOAH, supra note 14, at 29; see also Justin Wolfers, Is Higher
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societal notions of race and gender are becoming more fluid and less categorical,
as we recognize differing modes of self-identity and a larger spectrum of variation.
For these reasons, immutability seems a weak peg on which to hang constitutional
doctrine.
As to the second factor, the poor suffer from a history of prejudice and
stereotyping that is compounded by racial and gender biases. As poverty scholars
have explained, the poor have historically been categorized as either deserving,
meaning they cannot be blamed for their poverty, such as children, widows, and
the disabled, or undeserving, meaning they should be self-sufficient, such as ablebodied adults. 128 Public support is more generous for the former, stingy and
stigmatizing for the latter. This demarcation was put in stark relief when welfare
was reformed in 1996 from an open-ended entitlement program based on meanstested criteria. The theoretical foundation of the current welfare program, called
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”), is that individual choices
cause poverty, in particular, the individual choices of African American residents
of inner-city neighborhoods marked by concentrated poverty. Although AfricanAmericans only account for one-quarter of the poverty population, 129 and although
few welfare recipients have lifelong dependency on welfare, the dialogue and
debate surrounding welfare reform centered on a culture of pathology among
inner-city African Americans. 130 The media and politicians picked up on these
cultural explanations for poverty, and began demonizing the welfare queen, a term
popularized by President Reagan, which referred to a “woman of color who
manipulates and exploits the welfare system, scorns lasting or legalized
relationships with men, and has a series of children out of wedlock in order to

Income Inequality Associated with Lower Intergenerational Mobility?, FREAKONOMICS:
THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (Jan. 19, 2012, 10:28 AM), http://www.freakonomic
s.com/2012/01/19/is-higher-income-inequality-associated-with-lower-intergenerational-mo
bility/ (“It’s striking just how closely related inequality and [intergenerational] mobility
are.”).
128
See generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON
POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE 8 (1989) (discussing the “undeserving poor”); Joel F.
Handler, “Constructing the Political Spectacle”: The Interpretation of Entitlements,
Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 906
(1990) (“[T]he heart of poverty policy centers on the question of who is excused from work.
Those who are excused are the ‘deserving poor’; those who must work are the
‘undeserving.’ Ultimately, this is a moral distinction.”); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of
Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1505 (1991) (“[This]
distinction created a line running through the poor, putting the aged, infant, and disabled on
one side of the line, and the able-bodied on the other side.”).
129
JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA 3 (2003). African-Americans do, however,
suffer a poverty rate almost twice that of the national poverty rate. Id. at 81.
130
For a conservative attack on welfare, see LAWRENCE MEAD, BEYOND
ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 104 (1986) (arguing work should
be a condition of welfare) and CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984) (asserting
welfare should be abolished).

2014]

A COURT FOR THE ONE PERCENT

409

continue her welfare eligibility.” 131 The welfare queen became a frequent target
during the racially tinged debates over welfare reform in the 1990s. 132 During the
debates on welfare reform, congresspersons referred to poor mothers on welfare as
“breeding mules,” “alligators,” and “monkeys.” 133 In the end, TANF imposed work
requirements on welfare mothers, limited lifetime receipt of welfare benefits to
five years, and permitted states to require welfare recipients to conform to various
behavioral mandates and to promote marriage as a solution to poverty. TANF has
pushed millions off of welfare, but the vast majority of former welfare recipients
remain poor, either because they are working in low-wage jobs or have disengaged
from the social welfare system entirely. 134
As the TANF history reveals, the poor lack a meaningful political voice,
which goes to the third step of the suspect class test. A study by Martin Gilens
showed a statistical correlation between the views of higher income Americans and
policy outcomes. 135 While legislation reflects the preferences of higher income
Americans, the preferences of the poor are completely ignored, and even the
preferences of median Americans have no impact when their preferences diverge
from the wealthy. 136 Why do the wealthy fare better? Gilens hypothesizes that “the
most obvious source of influence over politics that distinguishes high-income
Americans is money and the willingness to donate to parties, candidates, and
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Nina Perales, A “Tangle of Pathology”: Racial Myth and the New Jersey Family
Development Act, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION
OF MOTHERHOOD 250, 257–61 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995);
see also Joel Handler, Ending Welfare as We Know It—Wrong for Welfare, Wrong for
Poverty, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 7 (1994) (“The image, often unspoken, is the
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POWER, AND POLITICS 167, 170. For a detailed description of the racist underpinnings of
the welfare system, see generally JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM
UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994).
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w.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412539-Welfare-Reform-What-Have-We-Learned-in-Fifteen-Y
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778, 786, 792 (2005).
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interest organizations.” 137 Similarly, Larry Bartels’s influential analysis of the
voting patterns of United States senators found that they were responsive to the
ideological views of middle- and high-income constituents, but the views of “low
income constituents had no discernible impact” on their voting behavior,
regardless of the Senators’ party affiliation. 138 The poor’s lack of influence is not
due to lower voter turnout (60% for the poor versus 80% for high-income
respondents) or lesser political knowledge or contacts. 139 Rather, “the data are
consistent with the hypothesis that senators represented their campaign
contributors to the exclusion of other constituents.” 140
At the same time, corporations and wealthy Americans have no limits on what
they can spend on political campaigns, and they can afford expensive lobbyists to
push for their interests. Professor Stephen Loffredo states that the Court has
remained resolutely noninterventionist with regard to legislation impacting the
poor by reflexively raising its fear of the “Lochner bogey” and “any backsliding
toward the anti-democratic judicial adventurism of that era.” 141 The result is that
“[c]orporations and wealthy individuals may wield disproportionate power at the
expense of the less affluent, but so long as the richest CEO and the most destitute
homeless woman each cast only a single ballot, this version of democratic equality
is satisfied.” 142 In short, the assumption that the poor have equal access to the
political process is incorrect; rather, the Court “has handed the elected branches a
carte blanche to deal with a politically dispossessed minority.” 143 By refusing to
see the overlaps between recognized suspect classes and the poor, both in theory
and in fact, 144 the Supreme Court plays a role in entrenching inequality.
3. Class-based Distinctions Are Subject to Rational Basis Review
The third tenet is that legislation that discriminates on class grounds is subject
to rational basis review. Unlike strict scrutiny, this level of review “requires only
that the State’s system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate
state purposes.” 145 It is hard to imagine a wealth classification that would not meet
137
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this lenient standard, and indeed, “the [Supreme] Court has not struck down a
welfare classification on constitutional grounds in thirty-four years and
counting.” 146 Moreover, deference to economic policy means that even the most
skewed tax rates cannot be challenged. The Court explained its rationale for
imposing rational basis review on wealth classifications in Dandridge v.
Williams, 147 in which the Court upheld Maryland’s family cap welfare policy. 148
That is, a policy of capping welfare benefits regardless of the size of a family,
thereby not meeting the state’s self-defined “standard of need” for larger
families. 149 The Court stated that, “[i]n the area of economics and social welfare, a
State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect.” 150 The Court acknowledged the
difference between regulations affecting business and industry and those that
involve “the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings.” 151 Yet, it
could “find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard.” 152 In short,
“the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by
public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court.” 153 This
theme was echoed in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 154
discussed below, where the Court stated, with regard to school financing, that “the
ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic
pressures of those who elect them.” 155 This deference, however, is selectively
applied, as the Court has not deferred to other laws that serve the 99%, such as
laws creating voluntary desegregation plans, laws regulating campaign finance,
and laws regulating consumer welfare.
B. Businesses and the Court
In contrast to the poor, businesses have fared well before the Supreme Court
in recent years. Numerous scholars have tracked the probusiness leanings of
today’s Court. Further, a close examination of business cases reveals a class146
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blindness that trivializes harm to consumers and employees, while being extremely
solicitous to business motives. The Court sees the market as a natural system
producing ideal outcomes, and thus, any challenges to market outcomes are seen as
disruptive rather than corrective.
1. The Roberts Court
In 2008 Jeffrey Rosen wrote in The New York Times Magazine that the
Roberts Court was “exceptionally good for American business.” 156 Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky similarly concluded that “the Roberts Court” is the most probusiness
Supreme Court since the mid-1930s.” 157 Progressive interest groups, liberal
politicians, and the media picked up this theme, spurring academic interest in the
alleged probusiness bias of the Roberts Court. 158 Studies confirm that business
interests have indeed fared well under the Roberts Court. 159 From the beginning of
the Roberts Court through the 2010 term, the position taken by the litigation arm of
the Chamber of Commerce, which both represents and files amicus briefs in favor
of business interests, “prevailed in 65% of cases before the Roberts Court.” 160 In
the 2011 term, the Chamber had a near-perfect record. 161 Moreover, the Roberts
Court is more likely than its predecessors to grant certiorari to cases involving
156

See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, § MM
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(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Chamber of Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1019,
1019–20 (2009) (explaining that between 2006 and 2009, the party supported by the
Chamber of Commerce prevailed in almost 70% of cases in which Chamber of Commerce
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business law issues, which constitute one-half to one-third of its shrinking
docket. 162
Some commentators remark that these conclusions are overstated because
some cases pit businesses against one another and the numbers may reflect the
Chamber’s careful selection of cases rather than a Court bias. 163 Professor Jonathan
Adler concludes that the Roberts Court is probusiness “insofar as it is sympathetic
to some basic business-oriented legal claims, it reads statutes narrowly, it resists
finding implied causes of action, it has adopted a skeptical view of antitrust
complaints, and it does not place its finger on the scales to assist non-business
litigants.” 164 Professor David Franklin identifies similar tendencies, finding that
“businesses seem to fare especially well when they are defendants; even better
when the justices appear to view the litigation in question as having broad
regulatory goals as opposed to individualized remedial objectives; and better still
when the justices view the litigation as lawyer-driven rather than party-driven.” 165
Overall, businesses have done particularly well in securing their positions in cases
involving “preemption, punitive damages, arbitration, pleading standards, and
employment discrimination.” 166
One defense of the Roberts Court is that it is not significantly more
probusiness than its predecessors. Indeed, history shows a steady uptick in
probusiness outcomes from 28% before the Warren Court to 48% before the
Burger Court to 54% before the Rehnquist Court. 167 Notably, the Rehnquist Court
began hearing cases in 1987, paralleling the escalation in income inequality.
Professor J. Mitchell Pickerill explains that the acceleration in probusiness
outcomes under the Rehnquist Court resulted from the solidification of the New
Right Regime under President Reagan, who was committed to an economic agenda
that centered on deregulation, tax relief, and supply-side economics and who
appointed jurists to the bench who shared his ideology. 168 He concludes that the
Roberts Court’s “pro-business decisions are best understood as the culmination of
a long issue evolution during the New Right Regime.” 169 President Clinton sought
162
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to blunt the Republican’s edge on business issues, and thus, he appointed Justices
who were moderate on corporate issues, while generally progressive on civil rights
and civil liberties issues. 170 President Obama’s appointees appear to be from a
similar mold. Overall, the Roberts Court has consolidated a probusiness tilt that
began in the Reagan era.
2. Under the Surface
Of course, counting outcomes and votes does not tell the whole story. As
Professor Martha McCluskey has pointed out, in order to understand how class
assumptions shape the law, “we must look under the surface . . . to examine the
way in which unequal class privileges and penalties become folded into the
background as natural and necessary to the public order. . . .” 171 Demonstrating this
approach, she unpacks the 2003 case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Campbell. 172 In that case, the Supreme Court reversed a Utah Supreme
Court decision upholding a punitive damage award of $145 million against State
Farm. 173 The Utah Supreme Court found that State Farm had “repeatedly and
deliberately deceived and cheated its customers” through a national scheme to
meet corporate fiscal goals by capping payouts on claims and that its “fraudulent
practices were consistently directed to persons—poor racial or ethnic minorities,
women, and elderly individuals—who State Farm believed would be less likely to
object or take legal action.” 174 Despite these findings, the Supreme Court held that
the punitive damage award violated the corporation’s due process interests.175
McCluskey takes on each of the Court’s rationales. First, the Court was
concerned that giving juries too much discretion might lead them to award punitive
damages based on arbitrary whims. 176 Yet, as McCluskey argues, the Court has
conversely upheld the norm of discretion for jurors considering the death penalty
in ways that result in racial discrimination and for police in enforcing mandatory
court orders of protection in domestic violence cases—in both situations, such
discretion can and has led to a loss of life or liberty. 177 Second, the Court
contended that corporations must have fair notice about the severity of penalties
for wrongdoing so that they can shape their behavior accordingly. 178 McCluskey
counters that corporations are well positioned to take rational steps to prevent and
mitigate the potential of any large punitive damages awards, especially insurance
170
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companies, as they specialize in risk management. 179 Third, the Court concluded
that evidence of systemic wrongdoing was inappropriate in determining punitive
damages. 180 McCluskey contends that this “individualizes and trivializes . . .
corporate wrongdoing,” while disregarding the clash of collective economic
interests between consumers and corporations as well as the systemic gain
obtained by corporations against less powerful actors. 181 She summarizes that in
the Court’s view, “capital owners’ organized and collective gain at the expense of
the non-wealthy is a fundamentally normal, natural, and just exercise of power,
while organized efforts to protect competing economic interests of the non-wealthy
are fundamentally unfair, not just debatable policy.” 182
This class-blind approach exists throughout the Court’s business law cases—
including a trio of controversial, 5-4 business law cases from the 2010–11 term.
Whereas the State Farm decision refused to allow evidence of systemic
wrongdoing in an individual case, the Court in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes 183
shut the door to systemic evidence even in a class action, ruling that a proposed
class of over one million female Wal-Mart employees could not prove common
claims necessary for class certification. 184 In Wal-Mart, women employees alleged
that the company’s discretionary pay and promotion policies had a discriminatory
impact on female employees, pointing to statistics showing that women filled 70%
of the hourly jobs in Wal-Mart stores, but constituted only 33% of management
positions, and across the company, women were paid less than men. 185
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia asserted that Wal-Mart’s policy of
granting discretion to supervisors over employment decisions was “a very common
and presumptively reasonable way of doing business.” 186 He assumed that “left to
their own devices most managers in any corporation . . . would select sex-neutral,
performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable
disparity at all.” 187 In this view, any disparity must arise from benign factors, such
as women’s lack of qualifications. For Justice Scalia, “it is quite unbelievable that
all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way without some
common direction.” 188 By contrast, this outcome was quite believable for Justice
Ginsberg, who authored the dissent. As she explained, discriminatory,
discretionary employment practices can result from unconscious biases as well as a
corporate culture that reinforces gender stereotypes through meetings, managerial
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transfers, and corporate monitoring. 189 Whereas Justice Scalia assumed good faith
on the part of the corporation and was incredulous at the stories of the plaintiffs,
Justice Ginsberg did not view obvious gender disparities as innocent. 190 Here, the
Justices’ underlying assumptions about how the workplace really works shaped the
outcome.
Class-based claims also failed in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,191 in which
consumers sued a cell phone company for fraud and false advertising after they
were charged over $30 in sales tax under a contract offering a free phone. 192 In a
5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs could not proceed by class
action in court because their contract required arbitration and, further, that the
Federal Arbitration Act bars class actions in arbitration as well. 193 In so doing, the
Court overturned California law that made it unconscionable for adhesion contracts
to bar class-wide actions. 194 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia’s sympathies
were entirely with corporate defendants, who might face pressure to settle
questionable claims due to the “‘in terrorem’ settlements that class actions
entail.” 195 By contrast, Justice Breyer was less concerned with the “terror” facing
corporations than the rights lost by consumers. He argued that agreements
forbidding class actions “can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon their claims
rather than to litigate.” 196 Indeed, “[w]hat rational lawyer would have signed on to
represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a
$30.22 claim?” 197 Given this dilemma, California law sought to protect consumers
from adhesion contracts that insulate corporations from liability for their own
frauds by “deliberately cheat[ing] large numbers of consumers out of individually
small sums of money.” 198 However, the decision gives corporations the power to
determine what protections to grant consumers, and the result may be a lack of any
incentives for corporations to comply with consumer laws in the first place. 199 This
case is part of a larger effort by the Supreme Court to interpret the Federal
Arbitration Act beyond its legislative intent and history to “render unenforceable
legal guarantees such as workplace discrimination protections—or protections of
any sort for individuals obliged to sign nonnegotiable contracts imposed by
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businesses or other large organizations such as consumers, patients, nursing home
residents, depositors, retirees, or investors.” 200
In another 5-4 decision, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative
Traders, 201 the Court held that a mutual fund investment advisor could not be
liable for making false statements that were included in prospectuses filed by its
separately incorporated mutual fund subsidiary. 202 In that case, the mutual fund’s
officers were all employees of the advisor arm, and the advisor entity drafted and
reviewed the fund’s prospectus. 203 Nevertheless, the Court held that only the party
with ultimate authority over a statement can “make” the statement, not “[o]ne who
prepares or publishes a statement on behalf of another.” 204 The dissent took a
broader view, noting that “[e]very day, hosts of corporate officials make
statements with content that more senior officials of the board of directors have
‘ultimate authority’ to control. . . .” 205 The majority’s interpretation insulates
managers from liability, “even when those managers perpetrate a fraud through an
unknowing intermediary,” which may have been the situation at hand. 206 Professor
Jeffrey Gordon commented that the majority’s formalistic approach ignores how
mutual funds are interrelated with advisory services in ways that spur “managing
agents to pursue their own objectives at the expense of the ultimate
beneficiaries.” 207 Gordon asks, in an era when the financial system’s gatekeepers
failed to prevent the meltdown of Wall Street, “[w]hy . . . shift responsibility and
accountability from actual wrong-doers?” 208
These cases are part of an overall pattern in which, time and again, the
Court’s majority gives the benefit of the doubt to businesses while remaining
skeptical of employees, consumers, and investors who challenge corporate
practices. 209 The choice is not between treating businesses as perfectly innocent or
wholly evil, as the majority seems to think. Rather, business enterprises are
necessarily self-interested, and sometimes, this motivation is harmful to employees
and consumers so as to require an outside check. The majority fails to
200
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acknowledge the complex incentives, cultural cues, and accountability failures
within businesses, instead assuming that the market will correct most problems.
The fate of Wal-Mart employees, AT&T consumers, and mutual fund investors
shows this is not the case.
3. Unions
In contrast to the rise of corporate influence over politics, the economy, and
the courts, the influence of unions has waned. In fact, the decline of organized
labor is a major factor—at least one-fifth to one-third—in growing wage inequality,
making it as significant as the stratification of pay by education. 210 Private sector
union membership has plunged from almost 25% of all workers in the 1970s to
today’s 7%, while wage inequality shot up over 40% over this same time period. 211
The decline of unions impacts not only unionized workers, but also other workers,
because unions have traditionally been the major interest group advocating on
economic issues for the middle and lower classes, such as executive pay controls,
pay equity, a higher minimum wage, and support for social welfare programs. 212
By contrast, advanced industrial nations with strong unions have seen less
economic inequality. 213 The decline of American unions starting in the 1970s is
traceable to several factors, including the growth of jobs in fields outside
“traditional union strongholds;” 214 intensified employer opposition; 215 congressional defeats of prounion reforms spurred by increased corporate donations to
Congress; 216 the appointment of Republican appointees to the National Labor
Relations Board, which in turn issued decisions that limited union organizing; 217
and the defeat of the 1981 air controllers strike by President Reagan. 218 These
trends reinforce a norm of free competition rather than fair competition. 219 The
210

Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage
Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 514–32 (2011) (providing factual support to show
declining union membership in the United States over a thirty-year period from 34% to 8%
for men and from 16% to 6% for women); see also HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at
56–61 (discussing the collapse of American unions).
211
HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 56–57; Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 210,
at 513 (noting that between 1973 and 2007, “wage inequality in the private sector increased
by over 40[%].”).
212
See Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 210, at 514–18.
213
See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 57–58 (noting that unions are
fundamental “to offer an organizational counterweight to the power of those at the top”).
214
Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 210, at 516.
215
Id.
216
Id.; see also HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 127–32.
217
Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 210, at 516.
218
HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 58–59, 186–87.
219
Michael Wachter, The Rise and Decline of Unions, 30 REGULATION 23, 23, 28
(2007). Contrast this trend to the rise of unionization in the New Deal, when policymakers
“were in agreement that unregulated competitive forces were destructive and were the
cause of the Great Depression.” Id. at 25.
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Supreme Court has not been a major player in driving these post-1970s trends
because its interpretations of labor law after the New Deal had already greatly
restricted the transformative potential of the National Labor Relations Act. 220
Recent cases are consistent with this history.
For instance, in 2012, the Court issued Knox v. Service Employees
International Union, Local 1000, 221 ruling against a union that charged nonmembers a special fee to support political activity. 222 Under California law, public
sector employees can create an “agency shop” by deciding through majority vote
to be represented by a union. 223 In order to prevent free riding, nonmembers have
to pay an annual fee for collective bargaining representation provided by the union,
but due to First Amendment constraints, they can opt out of supporting the union’s
political activities. 224 In the summer of 2005, the Service Employees International
Union (“SEIU”) was fighting several anti-union ballot initiatives, and it decided to
issue a special assessment to generate additional union fees. 225 Several nonmembers objected to having to support the SEIU’s political activities. 226
Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Alito held the union should have
required an opt-in for nonmembers, rather than relying on an opt-out procedure
and that this failure violated the nonmembers’ First Amendment right against
compelled support of private speech and created a “remarkable boon for
unions.” 227 The majority’s approach purposefully limits unions’ ability to raise
money for political activity. In concurrence, Justice Sotomayor agreed that the
nonmembers had the constitutional right not to financially support political speech,
as this was settled law, but disagreed that the Constitution required an opt-in
procedure for special assessments—an issue which the litigants did not request,
argue, or brief. 228 In her words, the majority’s opinion went far beyond the
question presented and, thus, “breaks our own rules and, more importantly,
disregards principles of judicial restraint that define the Court’s proper role in our
220

Cf. Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and
the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799 (2003) (discussing Court decisions
in the early part of the twentieth century that perpetuated race discrimination, thereby
limiting class solidarity by workers that could have strengthened workers’ rights). See
generally Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978) (discussing the
transformation of the labor movement); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War
Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981) (discussing “industrial
pluralism” or self-government by management and labor). For a discussion of how law
shaped the early American labor movement, see WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE
SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991).
221
132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
222
Id. at 2294–96.
223
Id. at 2284.
224
Id. at 2284–85.
225
Id. at 2285–86.
226
Id. at 2286.
227
Id. at 2289–90.
228
Id. at 2296 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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system of separated powers.” 229 Justice Breyer remarked in dissent that the Court’s
decision lays the groundwork for mandatory opt-in procedures for regular union
dues. 230 Moreover, by constitutionalizing the opt-in procedure, the Court shortcircuited a political debate about union dues and right-to-work laws that is
occurring across the states. 231 Here, deference to legislative choices is missing.
The outcome in Knox stands in stark contrast with Citizens United v. FEC, 232
discussed below, in which the Court held that corporate entities can spend their
funds on political campaigns without concern for shareholder preferences.233 To be
sure, Citizens United also permits unions to spend money on political campaigns,
yet there is an asymmetry between the ability of corporations and unions to fund
this activity. Corporations can spend their treasury funds without shareholder
approval, while unions must get the consent of their members. 234
C. Education
In America, education is widely considered the springboard to financial
security and an equalizer among social classes. 235 Nevertheless, our educational
system perpetuates a wide achievement gap between high income and poor
students, who are disproportionately minority and more likely to attend segregated
schools. 236 Currently, “[m]ore than 75% of predominately minority schools are
229

Id.
Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
231
Id. at 2306–07.
232
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
233
Id. at 886.
234
Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations and Political Opt-Out Rights After
Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 803 (2012).
235
See PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 58–59 (public opinion polls show that
Americans support government spending on education); Duncan & Murnane, supra note 75,
at 3–7 (“For many generations of Americans, education was the springboard to upward
mobility.”). On the historic roots of this concept, see generally Blanche Brick, Changing
Concepts of Equal Educational Opportunity: A Comparison of the Views of Thomas
Jefferson, Horace Mann and John Dewey, 32 AM. EDUC. HIST. J. 166 (2005).
236
See Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich
and the Poor: New Evidence and Possible Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?,
supra note 75, at 91 (stating the achievement gap is “now nearly twice as large as the
black-white achievement gap”); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Past, Present, and
Future of Equal Educational Opportunity: A Call for A New Theory of Education
Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 427 (2012) (reviewing JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES
AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA (2010)); Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful”
Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467,
1474 (2007) (“The ‘achievement gap’ results directly from the fact that high proportions of
African-American and Latino students live in conditions of poverty and that by and large
they attend segregated schools.”); Sabrina Tavernise, Education Gap Grows Between Rich
and Poor, Studies Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/edu
230
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also high-poverty schools.” 237 The concentration of poverty drives an achievement
gap that is compounded by lower funding for poor schools, despite the more costly
needs of their students. 238 Compared to their more affluent peers, poor children
attend schools with fewer quality teachers, less challenging curricula, lower rates
of achievement, and lower graduation rates.239 Many poor children also arrive at
school with the challenges of living in high-crime neighborhoods and coming from
less stable families struggling with the stresses of poverty. 240
Not surprisingly, family background plays a large role in educational
achievement, in part because wealthier families are able to invest more in their
children through high-quality early childhood education, tutors, enrichment classes,

cation/education-gap-grows-between-rich-and-poor-studies-show.html?pagewanted=all&_r
=0.
237
Derek W. Black, The Uncertain Future of School Desegregation and the
Importance of Goodwill, Good Sense, and a Misguided Decision, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 947,
959 (2008).
238
Id. at 957–58; Raegen T. Miller & Cynthia G. Brown, School Districts Give LowIncome Schools Less Than a Fair Share of Funds, NBC NEWS EDUC. NATION, (Dec. 1,
2011, 5:53 PM), http://www.educationnation.com/index.cfm?objectid=32551596-1C6F-11
E1-8E80000C296BA163&aka=0; see also Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as
Educational Resources and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373,
409–10 (2012) (explaining that middle class students enhance the learning environment for
all students).
239
GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV.,
BROWN AT 50: KING’S DREAM OR PLESSY’S NIGHTMARE? 21–22 (2004); see also Don
Boyd et al., The Effect of School Neighborhoods on Teachers’ Career Decisions, in
WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 75, at 377, 377 (explaining that schools with large
populations of poor children, on average, have more difficulty attracting high-quality
teachers); Vilsa E. Curto et al., It May Not Take a Village: Increasing Achievement Among
the Poor, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 75, at 483, 483, 486 (discussing poor
students’ lower achievement); Black, supra note 237, at 959 (discussing low graduation
rates of children at poor or minority schools).
240
See David S. Kirk & Robert J. Sampson, Crime and the Production of Safe
Schools, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 75, at 397, 398 (“[T]here is growing
evidence that violence in and around primary and secondary schools is a major barrier to
physical, emotional, and educational well-being.”); Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism
and Racial Inequality in Education Through the No Child Left Behind Act Public Choice
Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 647–48 (2011) (describing challenges poor
children face in their home environments); MARGUERITE L. SPENCER & REBECCA RENO,
KIRWAN INSTITUTE, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN OUR
EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY 11 (2009),
http://www.racialequitytools.org/resourcefiles/spencer.pdf (“Students of color are not only
compromised in the classroom, they endure cumulative home and neighborhood
disadvantages, including the scarcity of high-quality early childhood education programs,
poor housing stock, relative inaccessibility of healthcare, greater exposure to harmful
environmental pollutants, and high crime levels.”).
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private school tuition, and college. 241 For all these reasons, poor children are less
likely to attend college, which is the single strongest predictor of success in the
workforce. 242 We all pay a price for educational inequality because without
competent workers, America is less able to compete in the global economy. 243 In
short, educational inequality along race and class lines contributes to economic
inequality, which in turn creates a vicious cycle that further entrenches the
shortcomings of our educational system. 244 The Supreme Court has enabled these
disheartening trends by denying deference to legislative decisions to pursue
desegregation plans, while deferring to legislative judgments that skew school
financing toward wealthier districts.245 At the same time, the Court has refused to
recognize a right to education, and its commitment to diversity in higher education
is wavering. As one education law expert has summarized, “[w]hile the Court
alone does not bear responsibility for the current pervasive presence of separate
and unequal schools, the convergence of the Court’s actions in these cases has
substantially contributed to the deeply entrenched nature of segregation and
inequality in these schools.” 246

241

Neeraj Kaushal et al., How is Family Income Related to Investments in Children’s
Learning?, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 75, at 187, 187–205; Reardon, supra
note 236, at 91, 105; Tavernise, supra note 236 (reporting on a forthcoming study by
Sabino Kornrich and Frank F. Furstenburg that finds that in 1972, wealthy parents spent
five times as much per child as low-income families, but that by 2007, the ratio was nine to
one).
242
Martha J. Bailey & Susan M. Dynarski, Inequality in Postsecondary Education, in
WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 75, at 117, 117–18; Robert Haveman & Timothy
Smeeding, The Role of Higher Education in Social Mobility, 16 FUTURE CHILD. 125, 126
(2006) (articulating that in 2000 the median income for college graduates was twice that of
high school graduates); Robinson, supra note 236, at 427–28 (poor and minority children
are not adequately prepared for college or work); Michal Kurlaender & Stella M. Flores,
The Racial Transformation of Higher Education, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE COLOR
LINE: COLLEGE ACCESS, RACIAL EQUITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 11, 11–13 (Gary Orfield, et
al. eds., 2005) (discussing the racial gap in college participation rates for minorities and the
poor).
243
See Rebell, supra note 236, at 1475; see also Wilson, supra note 240, at 648–49
(stating that the United States loses wage earning potential and tax revenues when minority
children are not adequately educated).
244
Duncan & Murnane, supra note 75, at 3, 8; see Stephen Machin, Education and
Inequality, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, supra note 20, at 406,
406–31 (explaining how education is tied to wage inequality).
245
See Robinson, supra note 236, at 443–44, 454.
246
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: Understanding
and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated Schools, 88 N.C.
L. REV. 787, 837 (2010).
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1. Desegregation
In Brown v. Board of Education, 247 the Court struck down “separate but equal”
schools and committed the nation to equal educational opportunity for all
children. 248 For over a decade afterward, southern states aggressively resisted
complying with Brown’s mandate, 249 thus prompting the Court to issue several
decisions in the mid-1960s striking down a variety of obstructionist tactics. 250 In
1971 the Court told the lower federal courts that they had the power to desegregate
schools, including using busing as a remedy. 251 In subsequent years, desegregation
made a difference; up until the late 1980s, the percentage of students attending
integrated schools continually increased, and by 1988 nearly half of all black
students in the South attended majority white schools. 252 To date, desegregation
remains a proven method for improving the outcomes for poor, minority children,
without harming the achievement of white students. 253
However, beginning in the 1970s, the Court put the brakes on desegregation.
In Keyes v. School District No. 1, 254 a 1973 decision, the Court distinguished
between de jure and de facto segregation and held that only segregation taken with
247

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 495.
249
See Michael Murakami, Desegregation, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY 18, 21–30 (Nathaniel Persity et al. eds., 2008) (describing public reaction
and responses in the South to Brown both immediately after and in years following Brown);
Robinson, supra note 246, at 798–800 (describing the pressures on school board members,
politicians, and judges to oppose desegregation).
250
E.g., Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441–42 (1968) (ordering Virginia
school board to desegregate and rejecting race-neutral freedom of choice plan); Rogers v.
Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 199–200 (1965) (per curiam) (ordering Arkansas school district to
permit black students to attend the high school of their choice); Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
377 U.S. 218, 231–32 (1964) (holding as unconstitutional a county school board decision
to close all local public schools and provide vouchers to attend private schools).
251
Swann v. Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30–32 (1971).
252
Derek W. Black, Voluntary Desegregation, Resegregation, and the Hope for Equal
Educational Opportunity, 38 HUM. RTS. 2, 4 (2011) (“Though it is not the story often told
today, desegregation was very successful for a period of time. From the mid-1960s until the
late 1980s, the percentage of students attending desegregated schools expanded each year.”
(citing ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 239)).
253
See Black, supra note 252, at 2 (“[D]esegregation is the only policy with a long
and consistent track record of improving educational outcomes for disadvantaged
students.”); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIV. RTS. PROJECT, HISTORIC
REVERSALS, ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION
STRATEGIES 6, 11 (2007), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-edu
cation/integration-and-diversity/historic-reversals-accelerating-resegregation-and-the-needfor-new-integration-strategies-1/orfield-historic-reversals-accelerating.pdf; SPENCER &
RENO, supra note 240, at 13; Erika Frankenberg, School Integration: The Time is Now, in
LESSONS IN INTEGRATION: REALIZING THE PROMISE OF RACIAL DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN
SCHOOLS 7, 16 (Erika Frankenberg & Gary Orfield eds., 2007).
254
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
248
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a discriminatory purpose violated the equal protection clause. 255 This made it
nearly impossible to challenge racially isolated schools that resulted from
residential segregation, even though housing patterns are rooted in governmental
policies. 256 A year later, in Milliken v. Bradley, 257 the Court took a narrower view
of its remedial authority and struck down a federal court order that imposed an
interdistrict remedy on Detroit’s majority black schools and its surrounding
predominantly white suburbs, making it difficult to desegregate urban schools. 258
By bowing to the politically powerful “suburban veto,” the Court reinforced
inequality. 259
The Court stopped mandatory desegregation in its tracks with a series of
decisions in the early 1990s that not only limited the authority of the federal
district courts to order desegregation, but also encouraged them to dissolve existing
decrees—even if the dissolution would result in a return to racially identifiable
schools. 260 The lower federal courts complied. As a result, our schools are now
255

Id. at 208–09, 213–14. The discriminatory purpose test has been widely criticized
because it obscures the government’s role in reinforcing patterns of private discrimination.
See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 935, 939, 975 (1989) (asserting “that the discriminatory intent standard is not a
satisfactory comprehensive account of discrimination” because it is “vague and
indeterminate”); Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The
Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 584 (1965) (asserting “that the labels ‘de
facto segregation’ and ‘state action’ only obscure the issue of governmental
responsibility”).
256
See Black, supra note 237, at 950–51 (“Proving intentional discrimination or de
jure segregation, however, can be difficult, particularly in northern school districts that
never passed laws explicitly mandating segregation.”).
257
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
258
Id. at 744–45; see, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 729 (3rd ed. 2006) (“There simply are not enough white students in the city,
or enough black students in the suburbs, to achieve desegregation without an interdistrict
remedy.”); Black, supra note 237, at 951–52 (“In addition, Milliken signaled to whites that
they could avoid desegregation and build exclusive enclaves by simply moving across the
school district line. In that respect, Milliken likely exacerbated segregation.”); Rachel F.
Moran, Let Freedom Ring: Making Grutter Matter in School Desegregation Cases, 63 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 475, 487 (2009) (“As a result, Milliken sounded the death knell for
meaningful school integration in most cities outside the South.”); Robinson, supra note 236,
at 434–35 (“The Milliken I decision dealt a crippling blow to desegregation efforts because
most urban schoolchildren in northern and western cities were trapped within urban
districts that lacked sufficient numbers of white students for meaningful desegregation
given the substantial exodus of middle-class whites to the suburbs that occurred during the
1960s and 1970s.”).
259
James E. Ryan, Brown, School Choice, and the Suburban Veto, 90 VA. L. REV.
1635, 1646 (2004) (noting that the Court gave suburban schools the “power to limit any
education reform that would interfere with suburban autonomy”).
260
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (holding that salary increases for staff
ordered as part of a desegregation remedy went beyond the authority of the court); Freeman
v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495–96 (1992) (holding that a federal trial court can release a school
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segregated, mostly by district, at levels not found since 1970, when desegregation
was just taking root. 261 Now, the average white student attends a school that is
83% white, while about one-third of black and Latino students attend schools that
are 90% to 100% minority. 262 In short, “with the help of the courts, middle-class
whites successfully fought to preserve their schools for themselves by preventing
integration—and the minority students that integration required—from entering
their schoolhouse doors.” 263 The Court’s doctrine shifted from equal education as a
civil right to school choice as a civil right.264
Even voluntary desegregation plans are under fire by the Court. In 2007 in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 265 the
Court struck down voluntary desegregation plans undertaken by Louisville,
Kentucky, and Seattle, Washington, that considered race in certain school
assignments in order to ensure diverse schools. 266 The Court’s long-standing
deference to local authorities since the 1970s is missing in this case. 267 The
complicated opinion resulted in a 4-1-4 split among the Justices. The plurality
opinion by Justice Roberts held that the only permissible use of race in school
assignments is to remedy past, purposeful discrimination. 268 As Justice Roberts
stated, Seattle’s plan “is contrary to our rulings that remedying past societal
board from active judicial oversight incrementally before the board’s district achieves full
unitary status); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (ending a federal
desegregation order).
261
See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 253, at 5–7; Robinson, supra note 236, at 325;
James E. Ryan, The Real Lessons of School Desegregation, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO
COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 87 (Joshua M. Dunn &
Martin R. West eds., 2009) (“The plain, somewhat shocking truth is that the majority of
school districts—not schools, but districts, are either at least 90[%] white or 90[%]
minority.”).
262
Robinson, supra note 236, at 428.
263
Id. at 440.
264
See John Charles Boger, Standing at a Crossroads: The Future of Integrated
Public Schooling in America, in INTEGRATING SCHOOLS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: NEW
POLICIES AND LEGAL OPTIONS FOR A MULTIRACIAL GENERATION 13, 18 (Erika
Frankenberg & Elizabeth Debray eds., 2011).
265
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
266
Id.
267
See Ryan, supra note 261, at 89.
268
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720. Daniel Tokaji remarks that the case “overrules
decisions of democratically elected school boards, made after years of trial-and-error
experience in trying to integrate public schools. Yet missing from the majority Justices’
opinions is a persuasive justification for the federal judiciary’s substitution of its own
judgment regarding the costs and benefits of race-conscious integration programs for those
made by fairly elected local school boards.” Daniel P. Tokaji, Desegregation,
Discrimination and Democracy: Parents Involved’s Disregard for Process, 69 OHIO ST.
L.J. 847, 847 (2008). Rachel Moran critiques the decision, stating that “a majority of the
Justices were so concerned with limiting remedies for past discrimination that they largely
overlooked the problem of constraining a community’s capacity to imagine its racial
future.” Moran, supra note 258, at 477.
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discrimination does not justify race-conscious government action.” 269 By contrast,
the dissenting Justices, led by Justice Breyer, concluded that the voluntary
desegregation plans satisfied compelling state interests in diversity and avoiding
racial isolation and were narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 270
In his controlling opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed with the dissent that the
government has a compelling state interest “in ensuring all people have equal
opportunity regardless of their race.” 271 However, he joined with the plurality in
concluding that the plans at issue were not narrowly tailored to survive strict
scrutiny because they classified students on the basis of race.272 Instead of racial
classifications, Justice Kennedy suggested that school districts promoting diversity
can survive by using race-neutral mechanisms, such as site selection of new
schools, redrawn attendance zones, or even individualized evaluations that might
include race as a factor, in accordance with the Grutter case, which permits the use
of race along with other factors in law school admissions. 273
Importantly, the breakdown of votes reflects underlying assumptions about
the causes of residential and educational segregation. In his plurality opinion,
Justice Roberts stated, “The distinction between segregation by state action and
racial imbalance caused by other factors has been central to our jurisprudence in
this area for generations.” 274 In other words, for Justice Roberts, housing and
school segregation result from “other factors” (i.e., private, natural, market forces
outside the scope of government responsibility).
By contrast, Justice Breyer explicated a long history of purposeful,
governmental discrimination in the educational systems of Seattle and Louisville,
as well as governmental policies that created residential segregation. 275 He then
linked both these patterns to the current barriers facing cities that want to provide
diverse educational opportunities for their students. As he put it, “[t]he historical
and factual context in which these cases arise is critical.” 276 In light of this history,
Justice Breyer claimed that the cities had an interest “in continuing to combat the
remnants of segregation caused in whole or in part by these school-related policies,
which have often affected not only schools, but also housing patterns, employment
practices, economic conditions, and social attitudes.” 277 In Justice Breyer’s view,
government played a role in creating segregation, and thus, it should play a role in
dismantling it. For his part, Justice Kennedy similarly acknowledged that “[d]ue to
a variety of factors—some influenced by government, some not—neighborhoods
in our communities do not reflect the diversity of our Nation as a whole.” 278 In
269

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 731.
Id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
271
Id. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
272
Id. at 787.
273
Id. at 789–90.
274
Id. at 736 (majority opinion).
275
Id. at 804–19 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
276
Id. at 804.
277
Id. at 838.
278
Id. at 798 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
270
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short, Justices who draw a stark line between de jure and de facto segregation
without seeing the possible linkages between them do not support remedial efforts
to desegregate schools.
The majority’s refusal to acknowledge this connection appears either clueless
or willfully blind to the government’s role in creating segregated housing patterns,
which in turn, impacts school enrollment. 279 Professors Douglas Massey and
Nancy Denton have explained in detail how federal governmental policies served
to isolate and segregate urban, African-American communities from the rest of the
urban and regional environment. 280 In brief, the history is as follows. During the
1930s and ‘40s, African-Americans were trapped as renters within inner cities
when the federal government and private banks redlined minority neighborhoods
and refused to provide African-Americans with mortgages, thus reducing a source
of household wealth for generations. 281 Meanwhile, the white middle class left the
inner cities for suburban homes subsidized by federally underwritten mortgages
and on highways built with federal funds. 282 Further, the location of the highways
279

“Just as students of society know that race still matters, students of American
history understand that ghetto and barrio schools are not natural, but manmade. They grew
from a tangled mix of forces. This includes the blatant racial discrimination in housing and
seemingly ‘race-neutral’ zoning, and mortgage lending and real estate practices that over
many decades corralled people of color and the poor into what are now overburdened
communities and schools.” Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Susan Eaton, From Little Rock to
Seattle and Louisville: Is “All Deliberate Speed” Stuck in Reverse? 30 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 279, 288 (2008).
280
See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 149 (1998); see also Alice
O’Connor, Historical Perspectives on Race and Community Revitalization, THE ASPEN
INST., http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/upload/9OConnor.pdf (last
visited Nov. 16, 2013) (“[H]istory, with its central concern for human agency, shows
unequivocally that there is nothing ‘natural’ or inevitable about the racialized ‘pockets’ of
concentrated poverty that have become an accepted part of the urban—and rural—United
States.”).
Denton and Massey argue for dismantling the ghettos through integrationist policies.
For a critique of their approach, see John O. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of
Segregation: “Hewing a Stone of Hope From a Mountain of Despair,” 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1233, 1245 (1995) (arguing that the culture of segregation thesis is a variation on the
culture of poverty thesis that perpetuates stereotypes of the poor).
281
See DENTON & MASSEY, supra note 280, at 50–52. As a result, property owners in
the inner cities could not sell their properties, which declined in value and led to a “pattern
of disrepair, deterioration, vacancy, and abandonment.” Id. at 55; see also Florence
Roisman, Teaching About Inequality, Race, and Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665, 669–
70 (2002).
282
See DENTON & MASSEY, supra note 280, at 44. “As poor blacks from the south
entered cities in large numbers, middle-class whites fled to the suburbs to escape them and
to insulate themselves from the social problems that accompanied the rising tide of poor.”
Id. at 55; see also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 46 (1996) (“By
manipulating market incentives, the federal government drew middle-class whites to the
suburbs and, in effect, trapped blacks in the inner cities.”).
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destroyed many viable low-income communities and created physical barriers
within cities that separated poor neighborhoods from central business districts. 283
In turn, suburban planners used zoning and other exclusionary policies, such as
restrictive deeds, to keep out blacks and other minorities. 284
These segregated housing patterns were then reinforced by urban renewal
programs in the 1950s and 1960s, which compounded the isolation of poor blacks
by clearing slum neighborhoods in the cities to make way for redevelopment of
central business districts. 285 Displaced blacks were forced into new, high-density
public housing projects situated in already crowded black neighborhoods, which
became further destabilized. 286 Urban problems intensified in the 1970s, despite
the civil rights movement and rising incomes among black workers, due to subtle
(and ongoing) forms of racial discrimination in which “blacks [were]
systematically shown, recommended, and invited to inspect many fewer homes
than comparably qualified whites.” 287 Thus, segregated housing patterns did not
emerge by private choice; rather minorities “do not now, nor have they ever had
the range of housing choices that are available to whites with comparable incomes
and credit histories.” 288 Yet the federal government has failed to enforce the
nation’s fair housing laws, thereby permitting segregated housing patterns to
continue. 289 In short, government policies have been a key factor in creating
housing segregation, which in turn leads to school segregation, and vice versa. 290
The Parents Involved plurality ignores this history. As a result of Parents
Involved, local school districts and education advocates are going back to the
283

See WILSON, supra note 282, at 47; Michael Katz, Reframing the Underclass
Debate, in A NEW INTRODUCTION TO POVERTY: THE ROLE OF RACE, POWER, AND POLITICS
68 (Louis Kushnick & James Jennings eds., 1999).
284
See WILSON, supra note 282, at 50–51 (“Many states delegate broad powers to
localities that allow them to separate from predominantly poor and minority central cities”).
285
See Katz, supra note 283, at 68.
286
See DENTON & MASSEY, supra note 280, at 55–56.
287
See id. at 104; see also id. at 60–82, 98–100. “Although each individual act of
discrimination may be small and subtle, together they have a powerful cumulative effect in
lowering the probability of black entry into white neighborhoods.” Id. at 98.
288
Leland Ware, The Demographics of Desegregation: Residential Segregation
Remains High 40 Years After the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1155, 1157
(2005).
289
See Nikole Hannah-Jones, Living Apart: How the Government Betrayed a
Landmark Civil Rights Law, PRO PUBLICA, Oct. 28, 2012 (describing how the Department
of Housing and Urban Development gave billions of dollars to cities from the 1960s to the
present without enforcing fair housing laws).
290
School segregation also influences housing choices. As Justice Blackmun stated,
“schools that are demonstrably black or white provide a signal to these families,
perpetuating and intensifying the residential movement.” Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
513 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Erika Frankenberg, Metropolitan School
and Housing Desegregation, 18 J. AFF. HOUSING & COMM. DEV. L. 193, 195 (2009)
(discussing “the reciprocal effects that school and housing patterns can have on each
other”).
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drawing board to devise new ways to ensure racial and socioeconomic diversity. 291
Perhaps the “silver lining” of the Court’s jurisprudence is that pursuit of
socioeconomic diversity raises no constitutional flags because wealth
discrimination is viewed under a lenient rational basis test. 292 The class
achievement gap is now larger than the racial achievement gap. Currently, eighty
school districts, educating over four million children, use some form of
socioeconomic school integration. 293 Supporters assert that socioeconomic integration raises achievement of low-income students, without any negative impacts on
other students. 294 Others are more skeptical about the benefits of the
socioeconomic approach, noting that it does not lead to significant racial mixing or
overcome the racial achievement gap. 295 “Class-based solutions do not consider the
fact that white resistance to being in predominantly black neighborhoods is
independent of class and that the highest-income black families are as segregated
from white counterparts as the lowest-income.” 296 Thus, class-based solutions may
not be able to overcome the racial dimension of income inequality. In sum, it
remains to be seen whether class-based integration can reduce educational
inequality.
2. School Financing
When civil rights advocates became discouraged by the slow pace of
desegregation in the 1960s, they began litigating to secure equal financing of
schools. 297 School district boundaries reinforced existing patterns of housing

291

See Black, supra note 252, at 5.
Martha Minow, After Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 599, 635 (2008).
293
Richard D. Kahlenberg, Integrating Rich and Poor Matters Most, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/20/is-segregation-back-inus-public-schools/integrating-rich-and-poor-matters-most.
294
Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1545,
1557 (2007).
295
Minow, supra note 292, at 638; Ogletree & Eaton, supra note 279, at 288. Some
conservatives dislike socioeconomic integration because they fear it is a proxy for race, as
well as ineffective. See, e.g., Issues in K-12 Education: SELECTIONS FROM CQ
RESEARCHER 8–9 (2010) (summarizing objections).
296
Gary Orfield, Response, POVERTY & RACE (Sept./Oct. 2001) available at http://ww
w.prrac.org/full_text.php?text_id=711&item_id=7761&newsletter_id=58&header=Sympos
ium:%20Socioeconomic%20School%20Integration. “Student assignment plans that use
poverty tend to exclude remedies for minority middle-class students, who are often isolated
in inferior schools and behind in achievement.” SPENCER & RENO, supra note 240, at 8.
297
James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 253 (1999)
(“School finance litigation began in the late 1960s, at a time when civil rights advocates
were growing disillusioned with the pace and progress of desegregation.”).
292
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segregation. 298 At the same time, state legislatures have little incentive to equalize
funding across school districts given that suburban districts predominate in terms
of voting power and political clout. 299 Accordingly, in 1968 a group of parents
turned to the courts to challenge Texas’s education financing system, which was
funded largely through local property taxes, resulting in disparities between
wealthy and poor districts. 300 In San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 301 the Supreme Court rejected their claim, holding that unequal financing schemes did not violate the Constitution. The Court concluded that strict
scrutiny of the law was not triggered because the poor did not constitute a suspect
class 302 and because education is not a fundamental right. 303 While acknowledging
that education is important to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms
and the right to vote, the Court asserted that education is not guaranteed by the text
of the Constitution. 304 Moreover, the Court ruled that the school-financing scheme
was a form of economic and social legislation subject to rational basis review,
which in turn demands deference to legislative choices. 305 As the Court stated, “the
ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic
pressures of those who elect them.” 306 This paean to deference is missing in the
most recent desegregation cases.

298

Wilson, supra note 240, at 628 (explaining how the “Supreme Court[] has
arguably contributed to the inter-district disparities by legitimizing the primacy of localism
in its school equity jurisprudence”) (emphasis omitted).
299
Robinson, supra note 236, at 434; see Lisa R. Pruitt, Spatial Inequality as
Constitutional Infirmity: Equal Protection, Child Poverty and Place, 71 MONT. L. REV. 1,
96 (2010) (“Residents of more affluent counties . . . are unlikely to support a more
redistributive mechanism for financing local government or otherwise providing services
when the status quo so clearly operates to their immediate benefit.”).
300
See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The
wealthiest school district in San Antonio spent $594 per pupil, while the poorest district
spent $356 per student. Id. at 12–13.
301
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
302
Id. at 28. (“The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none
of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.”).
303
Id. at 35.
304
Id. at 35–37.
305
Id. at 40.
306
Id. at 59. The Court has continued to uphold state laws burdening the access of the
poor to education. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988)
(rejecting a challenge by poor families to a state law permitting local school districts to
charge a fee for bus usage). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (striking down
a Texas law that required undocumented immigrants to pay for public school education due
to the unfairness of penalizing children for their parents’ choices and in light of the
importance of education to “maintaining the fabric of our society”).
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Like the twenty-first century desegregation cases, the financing cases reflect
the Justices’ assumptions about the underlying causes of the challenged inequities.
The Court majority in Rodriguez viewed the financing disparities as resulting from
inevitable residential patterns created by “the growth of commercial and industrial
centers and accompanying shifts in population.” 307 As the Court viewed these
housing patterns, the Justices concluded, “[i]t is equally inevitable that some
localities are going to be blessed with more taxable assets than others.” 308 The
majority commented that wealth is not “a static quantity,” and it can change “from
any number of events, some of which local residents can and do influence,” as well
as from public and private incentives for businesses to locate within certain
districts. 309 In this view, the state has no responsibility to correct for segregated
housing patterns because these patterns result primarily from market forces.
By contrast, in dissent, Justice Marshall went further in identifying
government as a cause for educational inequality, emphasizing “the extent to
which . . . the State is responsible for the wealth discrimination in this instance.” 310
As he explained, the state not only created local school districts and tied school
funding to the local property tax, it also “imposed land use controls [that] have
undoubtedly encouraged and rigidified natural trends in the allocation of particular
areas for residential or commercial use, and thus determined each district’s amount
of taxable property wealth.” 311 For Justice Marshall, the extent of state
involvement warranted close scrutiny of the state’s financing decisions; for the
majority, the financing patterns reflected preordained, mostly private choices.
As a result of Rodriguez, there are no federal constitutional constraints on
unequal education spending, and not surprisingly, vast disparities remain within
and between states. Even federal funding under Title I, the education law designed
to support low-income schools, creates and permits disparities. 312 On average,
schools with high levels of poor students spend $825 fewer per pupil than higher
income schools, creating an average shortfall of over $500,000 in a typical lowincome elementary school. 313 In light of these disparities and the Supreme Court’s
abandonment of poor students, advocates have challenged unequal school
financing in state courts, relying on state constitutional provisions that provide a
right to education. 314 The results have been mixed. 315 Even where lawsuits have
307

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 48.
Id. at 54.
309
Id.
310
Id. at 123 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
311
Id. at 123–24.
312
See Derek W. Black, The Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal Protection
Through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 315 (2010).
313
Id. at 315–16 (“If one factors in the additional cost associated with educating poor
students, that gap actually jumps to over $1300 per student.”).
314
See, e.g., Pruitt, supra note 299, at 80–81 (2010) (stating that some state
constitutions provide greater educational rights than the federal Constitution).
315
For a summary of school finance litigation and its impacts, see RYAN, supra note
236, at 145–70.
308
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been successful, changes to financing systems have been modest and failed to
remedy the challenges facing poor schools. 316 School financing lawsuits also do
not enhance racial or socioeconomic diversity. 317 Further, state-based constitutional litigation cannot address the wide disparities between states. 318 Thus,
unequal school financing—reinforced by the Supreme Court—remains a problem
underlying educational inequality. 319
3. Affirmative Action and Higher Education
A college degree is increasingly associated with higher lifetime earnings, 320 as
well as better health, longer life expectancy, and increased civic involvement. 321
However, there is an income gap impacting college access and graduation rates. 322
Whereas 80% of high school graduates from the upper quintile of the income
distribution attend college, only 44% do so from the bottom quintile. 323 In top tier
colleges, 74% of the students come from the top quartile, while 3% come from the
bottom quartile. 324 This attendance and graduation gap is driven by several factors
that plague low-income schools, including lower-quality preparation in K-12
education, less ability by students to afford college, decreasing financial assistance
for low-income students, and a lack of understanding of the college application

316

See Robinson, supra note 236, at 436 (reviewing RYAN, supra note 236) (“Instead,
resulting school finance reforms typically focus on modest increases in funding levels for
low-wealth districts while simultaneously maintaining existing funding levels or raising
more slowly the funding rate for wealthier districts. This approach preserves the fiscal
autonomy of wealthier, typically suburban school districts.”) (citations omitted).
317
See Ryan, supra note 297, at 255.
318
David Karen & Kevin J. Dougherty, Necessary but Not Sufficient: Higher
Education as a Strategy of Social Mobility, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE COLOR LINE:
COLLEGE ACCESS, RACIAL EQUITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 242, at 33 (higher
education is “the necessary passport to middle-class success”). See generally Goodwin Liu,
Interstate Inequality in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2044 (2006)
(examining “the empirical and policy dimensions of the problem of interstate inequality”).
319
See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009). In Horne, a 5-4 majority overturned the
lower court rulings that Arizona had failed to adequately fund English Language Learner
(“ELL”) programs, in violation of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act. The Court
decided that the Act’s “ultimate focus is on the quality of educational programming and
services provided to students, not the amount of money spent on them.” Id. at 466–67. In so
ruling, the Court intimated that the achievement gap facing ELL students was not impacted
by funding, but rather by other causes, “such as drug use and the prevalence of gangs.” Id.
at 467 n.20. Of course, these causes allow the Court to place the blame for the achievement
gap on ELL students themselves, rather than the school districts that serve them.
320
Haveman & Smeeding, supra note 242, at 135.
321
Karen & Dougherty, supra note 318, at 36.
322
Haveman & Smeeding, supra note 242, at 126.
323
Id.
324
Id. at 130.
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process. 325 Thus, higher education is not promoting social equality to the extent
possible. 326
One mechanism to expand college access for minority students is affirmative
action. Initially, affirmative action was designed to equalize access to higher
education in light of our history, in which colleges enrolled few minorities due to
overt segregation and discriminatory admissions policies. 327 Currently, the Court
approves affirmative action for a separate rationale of ensuring diversity, which the
Court recognizes as a compelling state interest. 328 In 2013 the Court held in Fisher
v. University of Texas at Austin 329 that the means a university uses to achieve racial
diversity must be narrowly tailored and are subject to strict scrutiny. 330 It remains
unclear whether and how universities will be able to meet this stringent standard.
Accordingly, like desegregation at the K-12 level, this may be another area
where class-based affirmative action will become increasingly attractive to
colleges looking to maintain diverse student bodies. Here, too, the lack of
constitutional protection for class may prove beneficial for low-income and
minority students, as any college wishing to diversify socioeconomically would be
subject to a lenient rational basis review standard. However, the efficacy of classbased affirmative action is unclear. On the one hand, some charge that emphasis on
class may reduce racial diversity, given that poor whites not only outnumber
blacks, but also tend to have higher scores. 331 In other words, even within social
classes, resources and opportunities are distributed unequally and on a racialized
basis. 332 On the other hand, it appears that some carefully constructed class-based
plans can boost both socioeconomic and racial diversity. 333 At the same time,
325

Id. at 127, 135–37.
Id. at 128.
327
See Angelo N. Ancheta, After Grutter and Gratz: Higher Education, Race, and the
Law, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 242, at 175. The Court took
this rationale off the table in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320
(1978).
328
See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013) (citing
Bakke, 438 U. S. at 307–09 (1978)); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
329
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
330
Id. at 2419.
331
See Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 452, 465–66 (1997).
332
See Carson Byrd et al., Class-Based Policies are Not a Remedy for Racial
Inequality, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Sept. 30, 2011, at B37 (“While poor white children also
face substantial obstacles, their difficulties are not exacerbated by racial inequality and
prejudice. . . .”); Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status,
Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College Admissions, in AMERICA’S UNTAPPED RESOURCE:
LOW-INCOME STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 101, 132 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed.,
2004) (“Race and ethnicity matter in the distribution of opportunity, independent of other
characteristics.”). Carnevale & Rose argue for both race-based and class-based affirmative
action to achieve diversity. Id.
333
See generally RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & HALLEY POTTER, CENTURY FOUND., A
BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: STATE UNIVERSITIES THAT CREATED ALTERNATIVES TO
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skeptics will be eager to challenge class-based plans that look like proxies for race,
making litigation over race-based and socioeconomic affirmative action a reality
for years to come.
D. Politics and Power
Shortly before the 2012 presidential election, over 80% of Americans stated
that there is too much corporate money in politics. 334 Americans understand the
power wielded by money in politics but may not fully comprehend how the
Supreme Court supports this financial scaffolding. If the political system
contributes to economic inequality, then it is important to understand how law
impacts politics. As this Part explains, the Supreme Court has directed political
outcomes, dismantled congressional attempts to rein in corporate political spending,
and undermined the electoral process for low-income voters. In each of these areas,
the 1% flourishes, while the 99% becomes increasingly disenfranchised.
1. Supreme Court Influence over Politics
A main tenet of the OWS movement is that income and wealth inequality are
not driven solely by economics, but also by politics. Political scientists have
analyzed how political decisions reinforce and create economic inequality, both
through affirmative legislation, as well as through drift, or failure to respond to
changing circumstances. 335 As noted above, studies show that at the federal level,
senators ignore the policy preferences of people at the low end of the income
ladder, are minimally attuned to the middle, and are highly responsive to highincome voters. 336 Further, there are partisan differences within these trends; political scientist Larry Bartels has shown that Republican senators are about twice as
responsive to high-income voters as compared to Democratic senators. 337
Moreover, Bartels found that over the last fifty years, the incomes of middleclass families grew twice as fast under Democratic Administrations than they did
under Republican administrations, while the incomes of the working poor grew six
times as fast under Democrats. 338 This pattern results from partisan differences in
RACIAL PREFERENCES (2012), available at http://tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-abaa.pdf;
Matthew N. Gaertner & Melissa Hart, Considering Class: College Access and Diversity
(Univ. of Colo. L. Legal Studies Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 12-18, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137126 (describing a class-based affirmative action plan that
increased both socioeconomic and racial diversity at the University of Colorado).
334
See Jordy Yager, Poll: Majority Wants Corporate Money Out of Politics, THE
HILL (Oct. 25, 2012, 4:57 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/campaign-ads/264087poll-majority-want-corporate-money-out-of-politics.
335
HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 52 (defining drift as “the deliberate failure to
adapt public policies to the shifting realities of a dynamic economy”).
336
BARTELS, supra note 24, at 254–65.
337
Id. at 269–70.
338
Id. at 3.
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macroeconomic policies. 339 In short, “a great deal of economic inequality in the
contemporary United States is specifically attributable to the policies and priorities
of Republican presidents.” 340 Bartels notes that in his first term, “President George
W. Bush presided over a 2% cumulative increase in the real incomes of families at
the 95th percentile of the income distribution,” while there was a simultaneous 1%
drop in the real incomes for the middle class and a 3% drop for the working
poor. 341 By contrast, if Vice President Gore had governed over this time period, the
real incomes of the working poor would likely have grown 6%, the real incomes of
the middle class would have grown by 4.5%, and the real incomes of the top 5%
would have remained unchanged. 342
Of course, President George W. Bush can thank the Supreme Court for his
presidency. In Bush v. Gore, 343 the Supreme Court decided the outcome of the
November 2000 Presidential election. 344 Preceding the decision, Vice President
Gore had a popular vote advantage of over a half million votes and a slight
advantage in electoral college votes (267 versus President Bush’s 246). 345 The
election came down to Florida and its twenty-five electoral votes. 346 Out of almost
six million votes cast in Florida, and after a statutorily required machine recount in
the event of close elections, Governor George W. Bush led Gore by 327 votes. 347
Gore relied on Florida’s election law to challenge the results, and the Florida
Supreme Court ordered a recount of all ballots that either indicated no presidential
preference or more than one. 348 The dispute culminated in the Bush v. Gore 349
decision, in which the Court stopped the recount. 350
In its per curiam decision, the majority held that the use of manual recounts
violated the Equal Protection Clause because there were no uniform standards
governing how to discern voter intent on ambiguous ballots, and moreover, that it
was too late to implement proper procedures. 351 However, as Justice Stevens stated
339

Id. at 3, 34–42.
Id. at 3. Data “impl[ies] that continuous Democratic control would have produced
an essentially constant level of economic inequality over the past three decades, despite all
the technological, demographic, and global competitive forces emphasized in economists’
accounts of escalating inequality.” BARTELS, supra note 24, at 61.
341
BARTELS, supra note 24, at 63.
342
Id.
343
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
344
Id.
345
Richard Briffault, Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection Case, 29 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 325, 330 (2001).
346
Id.
347
Id.
348
See id. at 330–36.
349
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
350
Id. at 98, 110. For a more in-depth timeline of the developments that led to Bush v.
Gore, see Briffault, supra note 345, at 330–41.
351
531 U.S. at 105–06, 110. There are wide variations within and between states as to
how elections are administered, yet “[b]y the Court’s reasoning all of these variations
violated equal protection.” Erwin Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore?
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in dissent, the decision disenfranchised many voters whose ballots did reveal their
intent—thus creating an equal protection problem for those voters. 352 Indeed, the
losers were largely people of color, the elderly, and the poor, since many of them
face structural barriers to casting a perfect ballot, such as voting booth time limits,
lack of help for illiterate voters, and complex ballot technology. 353 Professor
Spencer Overton has further elaborated that the Court’s stress on a voter’s ability
to cast a perfect ballot emphasizes the merits of individual voters while ignoring
barriers facing people of color and denying them full political participation. 354
Overall, the overwhelming weight of media and academic commentary deemed the
decision highly partisan, given that the conservative Justices that constituted the
majority abandoned their professed commitments to states’ rights, a narrow
interpretation of equal protection, and judicial restraint.355 The decision not only
replicated patterns of economic inequality by disenfranchising certain groups of
voters, but it also enhanced Republican preeminence in the executive and judicial
branches, leading to policies that further entrenched economic inequality.

34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 17 (2002); see also Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary
Between Law and Politics, 1110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1427–28 (2001) (noting the variety of
voting procedures used by states and their subdivisions and commenting that the “irony is
that when the Florida Supreme Court tried to step in to remedy the problems caused by
differences in technology, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this—and not the more serious
technological differences—constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause”).
352
531 U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
353
Lani Guinier, Supreme Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 23,
48 (2002). Guinier notes that although blacks made up 16% of the voting population, they
constituted 54% of ballots that were rejected by voting machines. Id.; see also Spencer
Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 469, 483 (2001) (explaining that the Court’s merit-based vision either ignores or
tolerates barriers such as “lower education, a greater percentage of first-time voters, a
greater reluctance to ask for assistance, segregated residential patterns, and substandard
voting equipment and assistance at the polls in predominantly African-American
neighborhoods”).
Compare Overton’s explanation of why some voters struggle at the polls to Justice
O’Connor’s impatient question during the oral argument of Bush v. Gore, in which she
asked, “Well, why isn’t the standard the one that voters are instructed to follow, for
goodness sakes? I mean, it couldn’t be clearer.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949).
354
Overton, supra note 353, at 472, 476–77, 481–82.
355
See David Cole, The Liberal Legacy of Bush v. Gore, 94 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1429–30
(2006) (describing the “overwhelmingly critical” reaction to the decision); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 351, at 18 (“The supreme irony of the case is that the majority
was comprised of five Justices who are revolutionizing constitutional law through their
commitment to federalism and states’ rights, but here showed no deference whatsoever to
the state court.”).
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2. Business Influence over Politics
Businesses influence politics in many ways—from donating to political
campaigns to running ads supporting or denouncing politicians to lobbying
politicians once they are in office. There are almost no restraints on the extent or
form of corporate influence over politics, and this is a factor in maintaining
economic inequality. Still, the Court has struck down Congress’s own attempts to
limit its exposure to corporate influence.
As Professors Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal have
demonstrated, both political polarization and economic inequality have swelled
since 1975, and they are linked because polarization creates gridlock, thus making
it difficult to redress inequality. 356 Republican electoral success has driven extreme
polarization, 357 resulting in a decline in the real value of the minimum wage, a drop
in the estate tax rate, and lower federal income tax rates at the top of the income
scale. 358 In other words, people at the top of the income scale are obtaining
economically beneficial policies; those at the bottom are not. Escalating campaign
expenditures feed polarization, as a small group of extremely wealthy contributors
can focus their funds on politicians who support their ideology. 359 Because
Democrats are just as dependent as Republicans on campaign funds, they have
similarly failed to take on economic inequality as an issue and have become
increasingly probusiness. 360 Moreover, in today’s polarized climate, taking
extreme political positions makes fundraising easier,361 and funds are desperately
needed to meet the expenses of media and advertising that drive modern
campaigns. 362 Despite congressional efforts to rein in campaign financing, the
Supreme Court has reinforced the primacy of corporate money in politics, most
recently in Citizens United v. FEC. 363
356

NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED
AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 3, 165–66 (2006); see also
Linda Feldmann, Pew Survey: Partisan Polarization in U.S. Hits 25-Year High, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (June 4, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/0604/Pew-sur
vey-Partisan-polarization-in-US-hits-25-year-high.
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Voter preferences are tied to income, with high-income voters more likely to
support Republicans than low-income voters, who tend to support Democrats. MCCARTY,
POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 356, at 71, 106–07.
358
Id. at 168–72
359
Id. at 141, 160–61 (“The American economy . . . has created thousands of not-sotypical American multimillionaires and billionaires who have the resources to make
contributions substantial enough to have a major effect on electoral outcomes.”); see also
Paul Krugman & Robin Wells, The Widening Gyre: Inequality, Polarization, and the Crisis,
in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 10 (“[I]ncreased income and wealth of a small
minority has, in effect, bought the allegiance of a major political party.”).
360
See LESSIG, supra note 45, at 96–98; HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, 179–82;
MCCARTY, POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 356, at 142.
361
LESSIG, supra note 45, at 97.
362
HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 6, at 181.
363
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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The modern era of campaign finance law arose in 1974 in the wake of the
Watergate scandal when Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA), a campaign finance law that, among other things, limited campaign
contribution amounts, limited how much candidates could spend on a campaign,
and required disclosures for entities engaging in express advocacy. 364 In ruling on
the constitutionality of FECA in 1976, the Court held in Buckley v. Valeo 365 that
Congress could mandate disclosures and limit individual political contributions, as
they do not constitute speech or raise the risk of quid pro quo contributions to
candidates. 366 However, the restrictions on political expenditures, or money spent
on communications to voters, were invalid because such restrictions “limit political
expression at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms.” 367
After Buckley, the Court waffled in its deference to congressionally enacted
campaign spending limits. 368 In 1990, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 369 the Court upheld electoral spending limits on corporations in order
to limit the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 370
Nevertheless, by the 1990s, soft money, or money spent by political parties for
party building, began pouring into the political process through issue ads, which
avoided FECA regulations of express advocacy. 371 Entities such as PACs, 527s,
and other nonprofit groups also funded issue ads, which avoided forbidden “magic
words” that urge viewers to vote for or against a particular candidate, but are still
designed to shape electoral outcomes. 372 Congress passed the McCain-Feingold
Act in 2002 to close this soft money loophole in campaign finance law. 373 Among
other things, the Act prohibited corporations and unions from running
electioneering broadcast ads thirty days before primaries and sixty days before
general elections. 374
364

James A. Gardner & Guy-Uriel Charles, ELECTION LAW IN THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 640–52 (2012).
365
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
366
Id. at 143.
367
Id. at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
368
See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 581, 586 (2011) (“Since Buckley, the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence has
swung like a pendulum toward and away from deference . . . however, the Court has not
formally overturned any of its campaign finance precedents until Citizens United.”).
369
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
370
Id. at 660.
371
See Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 252 (2010)
(defining soft money and its application after Buckley).
372
See Hasen, supra note 368, at 588–89.
373
Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002 §101, 2 U.S.C.
§ 441i(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005); see also Hasen, supra note 368, at 588–89 (describing
the McCain-Feingold Act and its purpose).
374
2 U.S.C. § 441i(a).
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Initially, in McConnell v. FEC, 375 the Court held that the McCain-Feingold
Act permissibly restricted corporate and union funded ads that were “the functional
equivalent of express advocacy.” 376 However, the tide began to turn with the
additions of Justices Roberts and Alito to the Court and the decision in FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 377 in which the Court took a narrow view of express
advocacy and ruled that government could only restrict corporate spending on
advertising that was “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an
appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.” 378
In Citizens United, 379 the Court went even further, striking down all campaign
finance prohibitions on corporate expenditures—whether for express or issue
advocacy. 380 Such prohibitions were found to be unconstitutional because “the
First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on
the speaker’s identity.” 381 Citizens United resulted from an anti-Hillary Clinton
documentary shown on cable television via video-on-demand before the
presidential primaries of 2008 in violation of McCain-Feingold electioneering
restrictions. 382 According to the Court, it would be unfair to permit individuals and
unincorporated associations free rein to spend on independent expenditures, while
“certain disfavored associations of citizens—those that have taken on the corporate
form—are penalized for engaging in the same political speech.” 383 Based on
Citizens United, federal courts and the FEC have subsequently opened the door to
unlimited contributions by individuals or groups to super PACs, 384 which were
previously limited to $5,000 donations. 385 Critics of the decision, and there are
many, 386 have remarked on the Court’s overly solicitous stance toward
corporations given that “a corporation is an economic entity, not a citizen; a profitmaking enterprise, not an enlightened intelligence; a creature of the law, not a
375

540 U.S. 93 (2003).
Id. at 206–07.
377
551 U.S. 449 (2007).
378
Id. at 451.
379
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
380
Id. at 365.
381
Id. at 350.
382
Id. at 319–20.
383
Id. at 356.
384
A super PAC is technically known as an independent-expenditure-only committee;
these groups may not donate money directly to political candidates, but they can raise
unlimited sums to advocate for or against political candidates. R. SAM GARRETT, CONG.
RES. SERV., R42042, SUPER PACS IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS 1–2 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42042.pdf.
385
See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the
provision limiting contributions by individuals to political committees that made only
independent expenditures violated the First Amendment); Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1,
25 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (striking down restrictions on use of soft money by nonconnected
committees).
386
See Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 3
(2012) (summarizing the critical response).
376
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partner in a democratic project of political self-governance.” 387 As Justice Stevens
remarked in his dissent, “[corporations] are not themselves members of ‘We the
People’ by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.” 388
Importantly, Citizens United has implications beyond corporate spending. In
its opinion, the Court narrowed its conception of corruption to quid pro quo
campaign donations and rejected Austin’s endorsement of the antidistortion
interest. 389 In other words, “[a]ny concern for political equality—for limiting the
ability of the wealthy to deploy their financial advantage in the political arena—
has been ruled out.” 390 Yet, as Lawrence Lessig points out, corruption arises from
more than bribes. 391 Although such unsavory incidents do occasionally occur, a far
more pervasive corrupting influence comes from the normalization of dependency,
that is, “a corruption practiced by decent people” that leads politicians to focus
their efforts on initiatives favored by their financial supporters, simultaneously
souring citizens on democracy. 392 Justice Stevens put it succinctly in dissent:
“[c]orruption operates along a spectrum.” 393 Yet, after Citizens United, individuals,
corporations and other groups do not have to limit themselves to issue advertising
but can engage in express advocacy to elect or defeat certain candidates. Thus,
Citizens United results in “the nearly complete deregulation of independent
expenditures,” 394 or as Michael Kang writes, “the end of campaign finance law as
we knew it.” 395
Indeed, there has been a flood of money from outside groups in recent
elections; in 2010 outside groups spent $300 million, constituting an increase of
168% in House races and 44% in Senate races compared to 2008. 396 In 2012
Citizens United led to almost $1 billion in new spending out of the $6 billion spent
total, which is more than outside groups spent in the prior four election cycles
combined. 397 Time will tell if citizens, bombarded by corporate electioneering, will
387

Steven L. Winter, Citizens Disunited, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133, 1142 (2011);
see also Kang, supra note 386, at 12–13.
388
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
389
Id. at 363.
390
Richard Briffault, On Dejudicializing American Campaign Finance Law, 27 GA.
ST. U. L. Rev. 887, 890 (2011).
391
LESSIG, supra note 45, at 106–07.
392
Id. at 8.
393
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 448.
394
Kang, supra note 386, at 5.
395
Id. at 4.
396
Id. at 37–38; see also Winter, supra note 387, at 1134 (estimating that outside
spending exceeded $448 million in 2010); Richard L. Hasen, The Numbers Don’t Lie: If
You Aren’t Sure Citizens United Gave Rise to the Super PACs, Just Follow the Money,
SLATE (Mar. 9, 2012, 2:56 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2
012/03/the_supreme_court_s_citizens_united_decision_has_led_to_an_explosion_of_camp
aign_spending_.html.
397
Reity O’Brien, Court Opened Door to $933 Million in New Election Spending,
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 16, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/0
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become cynical and disenchanted, and whether lawmakers will feel compelled to
bend to corporate desires. 398 Professor Gene Nichol writes despairingly that
Citizens United rests on a “foundational conclusion that the United States
Constitution, ultimately, secures a power for people of wealth to use their
disproportionate economic resources to get their way in our politics.” 399 In so
doing, the Court overturned legislative judgments and elevated its own values over
those of the politically accountable branches. Justice Stevens summed up the irony
of the decision: “[w]hile American democracy is imperfect, few outside the
majority of this Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate
money in politics.” 400
3. Declining Political Participation by the Poor
While money is playing an increasing role in influencing the legislative
agenda, the poor are participating in politics in lower numbers than other
Americans and at decreasing rates. There are many reasons behind this trend: the
poor have less access to skills and resources that facilitate participation; they have
weaker ties to civic organizations and to trade unions that mobilize participation;
and they are not targeted by interest groups. 401 In addition, the poor face institutional barriers that can limit their participation, such as felon disenfranchisement
laws, citizen-initiated voter registration systems, and workday voting schedules. 402
Furthermore, the poor become discouraged about the efficacy of political
participation when they observe social welfare cutbacks and personally interact
with government bureaucracies, where they often face demeaning and skeptical
treatment. 403 Part of the decline is also linked to increasing residential segregation;
the least political participation exists among low-income Americans who live in
low-income counties. 404 “The result is that, as the most affluent become more
segregated from other parts of American society, the social ecologies that provide

1/16/12027/court-opened-door-933-million-new-election-spending; ADAM CROWTHER, PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH DIVISION, OUTSIDE MONEY TAKES THE INSIDE TRACK 3
(Taylor Lincoln ed., 2012), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/outsid espending-dominates-2012-election-report.pdf. It appears that corporations accounted for
only part of this spending; money mainly flowed from highly partisan groups who do not
have to disclose their contributors. Kang, supra note 386, at 6.
398
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 471 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Congress was entitled to take these concerns into account and to receive
deference for its judgments).
399
Gene Nichol, Citizens United and the Roberts Court’s War on Democracy, 27 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1007, 1016 (2011).
400
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 479 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
401
Joe Soss & Lawrence R. Jacobs, The Place of Inequality: Non-Participation in the
American Polity, 124 POL. SCI. Q. 95, 98 (2009).
402
Id.
403
See id. at 113–14.
404
See id. at 122.
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the most basic backdrop for political life grow farther apart and more unequal as
conditions for political engagement.” 405
For its part, the Court has recently reinforced the decline in political
participation by the poor by putting on its “class-blinders” in electoral cases. In
Crawford v. Marion County, 406 the Court upheld an Indiana election law that
required citizens voting in person to present government-issued photo
identification. 407 The challengers alleged that the new law substantially burdened
their right to vote in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and, further, that the
law was unnecessary to combat voter fraud.408 Indeed, even the majority conceded
that the record contains no evidence of any voter fraud actually occurring in
Indiana at any time in its history. 409 Nevertheless, the Court held that the State’s
interest in orderly administration outweighed any burden to voters in obtaining
identification. 410
In dissent, Justice Souter highlighted the burdens on poor, old, and disabled
voters to travel to the bureau of motor vehicles, especially given the limited public
transportation in Indiana and paucity of license branches. 411 In addition, the
required documentation for a voter identification card, such as a birth certificate or
United States passport, could be costly for “the poor, the old, and the immobile.” 412
Justice Souter also pointed out the restricted nature of Indiana’s law when it comes
to provisional ballots, which are ballots filled out by voters who arrive at the polls
lacking proper identification. 413 In Indiana, anyone who fills out a provisional
ballot and wants their vote counted must go to a circuit court or election board
within ten days of the election to sign an affidavit—another potentially costly trip
“uncomfortably close to the outright $1.50 fee we struck down 42 years ago” in
Harper, outlawing the poll tax.414
405

Id. at 123.
553 U.S. 181 (2008).
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Id. at 204.
408
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Id. at 194.
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Id. at 196.
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Id. at 211–16 (Souter, J., dissenting).
412
Id. at 216 (2008).
413
Id. at 216–18.
414
Id. at 237 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665–66 (1966)). A
win for voting rights occurred in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, 133 S. Ct.
2247 (2013), when the Supreme Court struck down an Arizona law requiring proof of
citizenship for voter registration on federal forms on the grounds that federal law (the
National Voter Registration Act) preempted the state law. Id. at 2254–57. Only about 5%
of Arizona voters registered via the federal form versus the state form. Michael Muskal,
Arizona to Keep Requiring Citizenship Proof on State Voter Forms, L.A. TIMES, June 17,
2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/17/nation/la-na-nn-arizona-officials-to-continu
e-requiring-citizenship-on-state-voter-registration-forms-20130617.
The state form is still allowed to ask for proof of citizenship. 133 S. Ct. at 2255.
Moreover, the Court left open the possibility that the state could ask the Federal Election
Assistance Commission to include state-specific instructions on the federal form. Id. at
406
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The Court delivered another blow to minority electoral access in Shelby
County, Alabama v. Holder, 415 in which it struck down Section 4 of the Voting
Rights Act by a 5-4 vote. 416 Section 4 identified certain jurisdictions with histories
of voting discrimination. 417 In turn, Section 5 required those jurisdictions to seek
preclearance, or approval, from the Justice Department before making any changes
to their voting systems, such as changing polling place locations or hours or
altering voting district boundaries. 418 Thus, Section 5, considered the most
effective civil rights statute ever enacted, is now effectively dead.419 Congress had
reauthorized the Act as recently as 2006, extending it for twenty-five years. 420
Nevertheless, writing for the majority, Justice Roberts contended that changing
political conditions over the last fifty years, exemplified by increased minority
voter registration and minority elected officials, no longer warranted the Act’s
“extraordinary measures.” 421 As he stated, “Coverage today is based on decadesold data and eradicated practices” that have “no logical relation to the present
day.” 422 Justice Ginsberg, in dissent (for Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor),
disagreed, arguing that deference to Congress’s judgment in protecting the right to
vote was warranted, especially in light of a voluminous legislative record of recent
examples of discrimination in voting, particularly through “second generation”
tactics designed to dilute the minority vote. 423 She warned, “[t]hrowing out
preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory
changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not
getting wet.” 424 As she predicted, the impact of Shelby County has been swift.
Immediately, Texas and Mississippi announced they would effectuate voter
identification laws; 425 these laws disproportionately impact poor and minority
2259–60. Thus, because Arizona has indicated it will do so, this victory for voting rights
may be short-lived and its impact limited.
415
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
416
Id. at 2631.
417
Id. at 2619–20.
418
Id. at 2620. The test for Section 5 coverage was articulated in Section 4: States or
political subdivisions that had maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to voting as of
November 1, 1964, and had fewer than 50% voter registration or turnout in the 1964
Presidential election. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 438, § 4(b)
(1965). Covered jurisdictions could also seek preclearance approval from the District Court
for the District of Columbia. Id.
419
133 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
420
Id. at 2621.
421
Id. at 2619, 2625.
422
Id. at 2617.
423
Id. at 2632, 2636 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
424
Id. at 2650. “All told, between 1982 and 2006, DOJ objections blocked over 700
voting changes based on a determination that the changes were discriminatory.” Id. at 2639
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 21 (2006)).
425
See Bill Barrow, Voting Rights Act Ruling Prompts Action by States, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 26, 2013, 8:02 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/26/voting-rightsact-states_n_3502062.html; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Invalidates Key Part of Voting
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voters. In light of the role of money in political campaigns and policy-making, one
might query whether giving low-income individuals and minorities access to the
polls matters. In other words, do Crawford and Shelby County matter? Professor
Larry Bartels answers yes, explaining that the views of poor people have an
indirect effect because their votes can tip an election toward a Democrat rather
than a Republican. 426 They may not have a direct influence on politicians once they
are elected, but by shaping who enters office, the poor can impact the course of
public policy. 427
III. EXPLANATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
On January 20, 2012, around two hundred demonstrators took to the steps of
the Supreme Court to protest the Citizens United decision on its second
anniversary. 428 Nearly a dozen people were arrested after storming through police
barricades. 429 Asked why she was demonstrating at the Court, one protestor said,
“This is the scene of the crime.” 430 The “occupiers” might have been even more
numerous and agitated if they knew the extent of the Court’s bias toward
corporations, disdain for the poor, and suspicion of equality-promoting legislation.
Protests are certainly one way to register dissent. While the Court is unlikely to
make decisions based on public pressure, the Justices are clearly aware of public
mood. Today, the lasting influence of the Occupy movement is its impact on
public opinion. Any future strategies for reform must consider the motivations
underlying Court decision-making processes. Accordingly, this Part offers some
explanations for Court doctrines that exacerbate economic inequality and makes
some suggestions for a long-lasting, progressive legal reform movement.
A. Explanations
Economic inequality results from a political process that is distorted by
corporations and the wealthy due to the influence of money in politics. However,
Supreme Court Justices are not supposed to be subject to the seductive influence of
Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2013, at A1. While Congress could enact a new coverage
formula under Section 4, it is unlikely to do so given the current state of political
partisanship.
426
BARTELS, supra note 24, at 282.
427
Id.
428
See Mike Sacks & Ariel Edwards-Levy, Occupy the Courts Clashes With Supreme
Court Police in Citizens United Protest, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 20, 2012, 6:19 PM), http:/
/www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/20/occupy-the-courts-supreme-court-police-citizens-un
ited_n_1219968.html.
429
Id.
430
Tony Mauro, “Occupy the Courts” Protests Hit Supreme Court and Federal
Courthouses Nationwide, THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (January 20, 2012, 5:05 PM), http://
legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/01/occupy-the-courts-protests-hit-supreme-court-and-fede
ral-courthouses-nationwide-.html.
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money. The Justices do not campaign for office, and business interests cannot
lobby them. They have entirely different incentives than political leaders because
they are appointed and have life tenure and, thus, do not have to fill campaign
coffers to maintain their jobs. They have nowhere higher to go professionally.
Moreover, they are insulated from the hurly-burly of politics because they select
the cases they will decide and cannot be reversed on constitutional questions. 431
Why, then, is there such a strong strain in Supreme Court jurisprudence in favor of
the 1%? There are two major models of Supreme Court decision making that shed
light on this question: the attitudinal model and the majoritarian model.
1. The Attitudinal Model
Under the attitudinal model, Supreme Court Justices vote their policy
preferences because they can. 432 In other words, Justice Scalia votes the way he
does because he is conservative; Justice Breyer votes the way he does because he
is liberal. 433 Political scientists have generated significant empirical evidence
showing that the ideological preferences of the Justices are predictive of their votes
in up to three-quarters of cases. 434 The attitudinal model reflects the insights of
legal realism in rebuking the traditional legal model, 435 under which judges
neutrally discern the meaning of law through formal tools. Justices themselves
claim fealty to the legal model,436 and to be sure, Justices sometimes vote contrary
to expectations. Many decisions are unanimous, suggesting that the Justices “share
legal values that can supersede policy preferences.” 437 Even proponents of the
attitudinal model recognize that other factors are at work in Supreme Court
decision making, such as precedent and modes of interpretation. 438 Nevertheless,
the attitudinal model is highly predictive and usually prevails when law is
indeterminate, 439 which is often the case in highly salient issues that come before
431

JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86, 92–93 (2002); Jeff Yates & Elizabeth Coggins, The
Intersection of Judicial Attitudes and Litigant Selection Theories: Explaining U.S. Supreme
Court Decision-Making, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 263, 264, 271 (2009).
432
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 431, at 86; see also DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 70 (1976) (“[T]he primary goals of Supreme
Court justices in the decision-making process are policy goals.”).
433
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 431, at 86 (making this comparison with regard to
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Marshall).
434
Id. at 415–24.
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See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 5–7 (6th ed. 1949); Karl
Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1222, 1231–37 (1931).
436
See MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW,
POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE 6–7 (2011); Frank B. Cross, The Ideology of
Supreme Court Opinions and Citations, 97 IOWA L. REV. 693, 697 (2012).
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the Supreme Court. 440 Along with their publicly professed ideologies, the Justices’
attitudes can also reflect subconscious biases in favor of elites and against the
poor. 441
The attitudinal model foretells that a right-leaning Court will issue
conservative decisions. President Nixon made several conservative appointments
to the Court beginning in 1969, halting the liberal gains of the Warren Court, and
President Reagan subsequently “solidified a conservative majority on the Court”
with his appointments. 442 Since the rise of economic inequality began in the 1970s,
there have been eleven appointments to the Supreme Court. Four were liberals
appointed by Democratic presidents (Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
Kagan), six were conservatives appointed by Republican presidents (Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Alito), and one was a Republican
appointee who turned out to be liberal (Justice Souter). Conservative Justices have
predominated during the bulk of the time period in which economic inequality has
increased. This is no accident. Conservative Republicans opposed to big
government and dedicated to protecting the wealthy successfully launched a
disciplined strategy to get conservative judges appointed throughout the
judiciary. 443
Currently, there are four liberal Justices, four conservative Justices, and a
swing Justice whose vote is often determinative in close cases (Justice Kennedy).
Since 2005, Justice Kennedy has sided twice as often with the conservative wing
than the liberal wing in 5-4 decisions. 444 Given this 5–4 line-up, the attitudinal
model may well explain the Court’s conservatism. The four most conservative
Justices share a meritocratic conception of American society that is class blind and
colorblind. They also view the private market as descriptively and normatively
separate from government. Given these underlying ideological commitments, the
Court has rejected legislative efforts to regulate market excesses, to restrain the
influence of money in campaigns, and to diversify schools, while upholding
440
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See Beth Loy, Exploring a “Non-Traditional” Contender in the Battle for
Equitable Justice: Introducing Economic Welfare Bias, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395,
400 (2002) (finding that judges based decisions under the Americans with Disabilities Act
on the economic status of their circuit’s constituents). “The essence of this hypothesis is
that judiciaries tend to excuse discrimination in tough economic times when viable
employers are needed to stimulate growth for their constituents.” Id. at 400.
442
Pickerill, supra note 163, at 1067.
443
See Simon Lazarus, Hertz or Avis? Progressives’ Quest to Reclaim the
Constitution and the Courts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1203–04 (2011) (evaluating
progressive responses to the growth of originalism and the success of conservatives in
shaping the judiciary); see generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE
LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008) (examining the rise of
conservatives to challenge liberalism in academic and legal institutions).
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legislation that draws lines between and among the poor. At the same time, the
Court upholds private market outcomes, such as corporate cultures and practices
that disadvantage employees and consumers. The attitudinal model suggests that
the Court’s policy preferences will not change unless the composition of the Court
changes or individual Justices evolve in their policy preferences.
2. The Public-Opinion Model
The second model stresses the majoritarian role of the Court, arguing that the
Justices vote in accord with public opinion in order to preserve their legitimacy. 445
This model responds to the countermajoritarian difficulty posed by Professor
Alexander Bickel; that is, why courts, which are not accountable politically, should
have the final say in striking down popularly enacted laws. 446 If courts reflect
popular will, this moral problem with judicial review disappears. Professor Barry
Friedman is a prominent proponent of the majoritarian view, asserting that
“judicial decisions fall within the range of acceptability,” 447 at least over time. 448
Indeed, a comparison of Court votes and public opinion polls confirms an
association between the Court’s decisions and public mood. 449 This correlation
could result simply from the fact that the Justices are subject to the same cultural
stimuli as the rest of the citizenry, 450 or alternatively, the Justices may be
constrained by public opinion because they want to ensure their decisions are
enforced and survive attacks by the other branches.451
Does the majoritarian model mean that the public supports a Supreme Court
for the 1%? On the one hand, the public has long overestimated the extent of social
mobility in America. One poll showed that 69% of Americans believe that
“[p]eople are rewarded for intelligence and skills;” even in the heart of the
recession, a poll found that 39% believed that it was common for people to start
out poor and end up rich. 452 In this regard, there are divisions along party lines.
445
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Republicans are twice as likely to believe that everyone in American society has an
opportunity to succeed, while Independents and Democrats are three and four
times more likely to say that only some people have the opportunity to exceed. 453
On the other hand, there is growing awareness, partly culminating in and
resulting from the Occupy Wall Street movement, that the wealthy have
advantages over other Americans. 454 In November 2011, during the height of the
Occupy movement, a Wall Street Journal poll found that 76% agreed (with 60%
strongly agreeing) that “the nation’s economic structure of the country is out of
balance and favors a very small proportion of the rich over the rest of the
country.” 455 In April 2012, 62% thought it was important that “the government
introduce policies to reduce inequality in the U.S.,” with 34% stating that this was
very important. 456 Another survey asked respondents to select a diagram showing
an ideal distribution of wealth, and they overwhelmingly selected a wealth
distribution chart that reflected Sweden rather than the United States. 457 In sum,
“Americans are both philosophically conservative and operationally liberal.” 458 In
other words, “[t]hey believe in individual responsibility, free enterprise, and the
American Dream,” but also “accept that government help may be needed to
address concrete barriers to pursuing opportunity.” 459 Public opinion thus suggests
that most Americans would disapprove of Supreme Court decisions that foster
inequality—if they were aware of the decisions and how they are connected to
inequality.
However, the range of decisions discussed in this Article stretch over a wide
array of substantive issues, not all of which are obviously linked to economic
inequality. Most of these decisions are not about inequality on their face; rather,
they contribute to inequality. Further, the bulk of Supreme Court decisions fly
under the radar screen of public scrutiny, further attenuating the constraint of
public opinion on the Court. In studies of specific issues that impact inequality, the
Court is sometimes aligned with public opinion, such as with affirmative action in
higher education (the public generally supports soft preferences for diversity and
rejects quotas), 460 and sometimes out of alignment, such as with public school
453

See BARTELS, supra note 24, at 150.
See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL 251 (2d ed. 2009) (arguing
that most Americans believe that government is run “for a few big interests”).
455
Jonathan Weisman, Election 2012: Poll Finds Voters are Deeply Divided, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 8, 2011, at A6.
456
Humphrey Taylor, Americans See Inequality as a Major Problem: Division as to
Who Would be Best to Address It—Republicans or President Obama, HARRIS INTERACTIVE
(Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/mid/15
08/articleId/1002/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/Default.aspx (citing The Harris Poll #37,
Apr. 5, 2012).
457
See STIGLITZ, supra note 11, at 127.
458
PAGE & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 3.
459
Id.
460
Loan Le & Jack Citrin, Affirmative Action, in PUBLIC OPINION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 162, 162–64 (Persily et al. eds., 2008).
454

2014]

A COURT FOR THE ONE PERCENT

449

integration (which the public generally supports) 461 and campaign finance reform
(which the public also supports). 462 Yet, even when the Court issues wildly
unpopular decisions, such as Bush v. Gore and Citizens United, it retains the
support of the public as an institution. 463 Its diffuse support is quite strong.
What are the implications of this support? In the aftermath of the Court’s
decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 464 to uphold
the individual health care mandate in the Affordable Care Act, news reports
speculated that Justice Roberts switched his vote in order to win public support and
enhance the legitimacy of the Court. 465 On the one hand, this case may
demonstrate the majoritarian model in action. On the other hand, Justice Roberts
may simply have been articulating his own view of judicial restraint without regard
to popular opinion, and indeed, popular opinion was quite split on the advisability
of the individual health care mandate.
Along these lines, Professor Richard Pildes argues that the majoritarian model
overstates the constraints on the Court, given that the political branches rarely
confront the Court, particularly in highly polarized periods in which a Court
majority can garner the support of enough lawmakers to protect itself. 466 As a
result, “[t]he modern Court has considerably more latitude to depart from
‘majoritarian preferences,’ however defined, and the Court knows it.” 467 If the
majoritarian model is accurate, it implies that public opinion on inequality may
influence the Court, but only if the public and the Court understand and accept the
complex connection between law and economic inequality. Even if the
majoritarian model overstates its case, no one—including the Justices
themselves 468—denies that the Court is aware of public opinion and that it can
sometimes shape Supreme Court decision making. In turn, this suggests that a
movement such as Occupy Wall Street can have an impact on the Court, but only
to the extent that a Justice’s attitudinal preferences are open to persuasion. In the
end, attitude and public opinion can be mutually reinforcing and both appear to
play a role in Supreme Court decision making.
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B. Solutions
In July 2012 economists Jacob Hacker and Nate Loewentheil released a
manifesto, full of detailed suggestions for reducing economic inequality, 469 which
was supported by groups, including the AFL-CIO, Center for Community Change,
Economic Policy Institute, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights,
National Council of La Raza and SEIU. The report’s recommendations are
organized around the principles of growth, security, and democracy, and its ideas
are specific and wide ranging, including spurring job growth through infrastructure
improvements, guaranteeing college for all, expanding rights to collective
bargaining, and limiting corporate lobbying. 470 Indeed, there is no shortage of
detailed, carefully considered suggestions for reform from these and other experts.
After examining the economic literature on inequality, journalist Timothy Noah
recommends a progressive tax system, expanding the federal payroll, importing
skilled labor, universalizing preschool, controlling the prices of higher education,
regulating Wall Street, electing Democratic presidents, and reviving the labor
movement. 471 Stiglitz envisions a similar reform agenda that would increase
economic efficiency, fairness, and opportunity by curbing excesses at the top with
some redistribution towards the 99%. 472 Professor David Brady calls for tested
policies that have proven to work in other affluent democracies. 473 In general, these
proposals do not address the Supreme Court, other than to call for an overruling of
Citizens United. Yet, as this Article demonstrates, Citizens United is just one piece
of a much larger problem.
We currently have a Court majority that is not only unsympathetic to
inequality arguments, but also seemingly oblivious to (or skeptical of) the
connection between government policies and market outcomes. The Court has
ruled that it is up to the legislative branch, rather than the Courts, to remedy
economic inequality. Yet, the Court has doomed legislative enactments that would
ameliorate inequality, such as desegregation plans, campaign finance reforms, and
consumer protection laws. Conversely, when legislatures enact policies that tend to
worsen economic inequality or magnify its effects, the Court defers, such as school
financing laws and voter identification requirements. In short, the Court’s rulings
consistently sustain policies that create or maintain economic inequality.
Nevertheless, and in the spirit of the OWS movement, progressive lawyers can
develop strategies for expanding social justice, using the tools that lawyers can
bring to the table. After all, the Court’s membership will change with new
469
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appointments, and the Justices’ attitudes can evolve over time—just as public
opinion does.
Thus, this Article makes five suggestions for the economic justice lawyering
movement. First, we need to continue to develop theoretical and doctrinal
frameworks centered on economic fairness. Second, we need to engage with other
disciplines in building a social science record that reveals the connection between
law, policy, and economic hardship. Third, progressive lawyering movements need
to recognize the role of class in racial and gender disparities and to advance a
robust economic justice movement that benefits the entire 99%. Fourth, we need
multidisciplinary strategies for fighting economic injustice that expand beyond
litigation and courts to ensure rights. Finally, we need to expand access to justice
in order to ensure that the judicial system is responsive to the 99%.
1. A Legal Philosophy of Equality
To begin with, progressive lawyers need to continue the work of Professor
Frank Michelman and other scholars to develop legal theories that promote and
sustain economic justice for the 99%. In the 1970s, as the Court appeared poised to
enforce social and economic rights, Michelman reflected upon the political
philosophy of John Rawls and advocated for a baseline minimum of social and
economic rights in lieu of equality, as the Court is better suited to articulate the
former than the latter. 474 Professor William Forbath extended Michelman’s theory
and argued that a baseline minimum should include not only welfare, but also a
right to dignified work in order to ensure social citizenship for all. 475 He asserts
that welfare alone cannot ensure political equality or “undo the stigma of
permanent exclusion from a shared destiny of work and opportunity.” 476 Using a
more communitarian framework, Professor Goodwin Liu veers away from
Rawlsian notions of justice to endorse political philosopher Michael Walzer’s
thoery of “shared understandings.” 477 In Walzer’s approach, society arrives at a
consensus about essential welfare goods through its “institutions, laws, and
practices.” 478 Liu acknowledges that under this approach, law follows politics,
which in turn suggests a focus on the political branches to effectuate change.479 As
474
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an example, Liu suggests that society has arrived at a shared commitment to equal
educational opportunities, which in turn, supports a legal claim to equal federal
educational financing between states. 480
In another theoretical stance, several prominent constitutional law professors
have turned the conservative commitment to originalism on its head by explaining
how the original meaning of the Constitution is consistent with liberal, progressive
positions. 481 Alternatively, Professor Helen Hershkoff argues that state constitutions, which often provide express social and economic rights, are more viable
mechanisms for protecting the poor than the federal Constitution. 482 While these
various approaches differ, they share a belief in the constitutional viability of rights
claims for the poor, and thus, give hope that social movements toward economic
justice can shape constitutional interpretation in the future. Giving up on
constitutional claims for economic justice can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, 483
as can ceding legitimacy to conservative interpretations of the constitution. 484 One
need only look at the Court’s reversal of its views with regard to the
criminalization of homosexual conduct to know that theory needs to be ready and
waiting when the Court catches up to societal norms.
2. The Facts of Economic Inequality
Theory alone is not enough. Courts need to see a factual record that reveals
the connections between government policies and economic inequality and
debunks the idea that the market always produces fair outcomes. They need to be
educated about the real world consequences of the decisions they make. 485 Many
of the books cited in this Article, written by renowned economists, political
scientists, and journalists, make this case through careful empirical analysis. Thus,
interdisciplinary explanations regarding economic inequality are available for
lawyers to present to courts. Further, social scientists have established that one’s
economic status is not determined solely by behavior, as the majority of Justices
seem to assume, but rather, that structural economic factors are at play. 486 This
challenges the Justices’ ingrained notions of deservedness.
480
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In the United States, poverty is seen as a personal failing. 487 In this dominant
“culture of poverty” perspective, poverty is tied to individual behavior. 488 This
viewpoint is consistent with our American myth of meritocracy, which holds that
with hard work and sheer grit, anyone can pull themselves up by their
bootstraps. 489 Conversely, a failure to thrive in our capitalist marketplace is a moral
failure. 490 If poverty is a choice, then the rest of society has “a justification for
doing so little,” and we are off the hook for assisting the poor. 491 An alternate
narrative focuses on how structural forces within our economy and society cause
poverty. 492 In this perspective, the poor are trapped in the underclass due to forces
outside their control that limit their economic opportunities and social mobility. 493
For instance, trends discussed previously in this Article, such as globalization, the
weakening of unions, and economic shifts from a manufacturing base to a service
economy, have left behind people without college degrees. 494 Likewise, even
working adults can remain trapped below the poverty line if they do not have a
living wage, affordable housing, or child-care. 495 Some people of color remain
487
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excluded from the mainstream economy as a result of a legacy of race
discrimination in housing and the workplace, as well as the criminal justice
system. 496 These structural forces undermine the meritocracy myth.
While debates have raged between the behaviorist and structuralist
explanations for poverty, sociologist William Julius Wilson instead explains how
behavioral and structural factors intersect. 497 His work focuses on low-income,
urban, African-American communities, and he has shown how people who grow
up in racially segregated, poor neighborhoods develop coping mechanisms and
responses that “emerge from patterns of racial exclusion” and end up limiting
social mobility. 498 Accordingly, Wilson concludes that “structural factors are likely
to play a far greater role than cultural factors in bringing about rapid neighborhood
change. As he points out, a strong economy lessens poverty (and its associated
pathologies), while a weak economy increases poverty. If culture were
determinative, then increased economic opportunity would not have a
transformative impact in poor communities. 499 In short, structural forces drive
behavioral responses, and the resultant behavior “often reinforces the very
conditions that have emerged from structural inequities.” 500 Most judges do not
come to the bench with these sophisticated understandings about poverty; thus, this
is an area where cross-disciplinary explanations and evidence may make a
difference to legal advocacy.
3. Coalitions for Economic Justice
Historically, unions have been the main advocacy group for issues related to
economic equality. Yet, unions have been criticized for representing the interests
of white, male workers, rather than of women and minorities. 501 Moreover, labor
496
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law as implemented by legislatures and interpreted by courts has encouraged “a
divide between unionism and social justice movements” by narrowing the labor
agenda and focusing on particular constituencies. 502 Conversely, identity-based
movements based on race and gender have tended to focus on civil rights rather
than economic issues, 503 and within these movements, some voices have been
marginalized. 504 Furthermore, progressive lawyering has splintered into highly
specialized focus areas (such as immigration law, homelessness, domestic violence,
and the like) that provide targeted representation to clients, but limit crosscollaboration. 505 In light of these tensions, both real and perceived, a movement for
economic equality will be more effective if it brings together these movements and
issues, along with the energy, wisdom, and experience these divergent strands can
bring together. 506 For instance, in recent years unions and civil rights groups have
recognized “common interests in order to further their shared goals,” 507 and unions
have played a role in improving communities of color. 508
In this spirit, social justice advocates need to recognize the intersectional
impacts of class, race, gender, and other identities on economic welfare. 509
(2001) (“The labor organizing movement, which has focused on creating class solidarity
among the working poor, also has a history of ignoring identity-based interests.”). Cf.
Charlotte Garden & Nancy Leong, “So Closely Intertwined”: Labor and Racial Solidarity,
81 G.W. L. REV. 1135 (2013) (arguing that while this may have been true historically,
today civil rights groups and unions often work collaboratively and share the same
interests).
502
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Professor Mari Matsuda proposes a way to “understand the interconnection of all
forms of subordination” by asking “the other question.” 510 As she states:
When I see something that looks racist, I ask, “Where is the
patriarchy in this?” When I see something that looks sexist, I ask,
“Where is the heterosexism in this?” When I see something that looks
homophobic, I ask, “Where are the class interests in this?” Working in
coalition forces us to look for both the obvious and non-obvious
relationships of domination, helping us to realize that no form of
subordination ever stands alone. 511
In addition to asking “the other question,” we need a sophisticated
understanding of class, 512 which provides less of a personal identity or basis for
group solidarity in the United States than other shared aspects of identity, such as
race or gender or sexual orientation. 513 As Professor Trina Jones explains, class
stereotypes and beliefs are “dynamic and fluid” and not easy to define, as class
emerges from “[w]ealth, educational background, occupational skill and status,
consumption patterns and practices, and residential location, among other
things.” 514 Professor Deborah Malamud similarly observes, “[t]he factors
contributing to relative economic advantage exist in a delicate balance and interact
in space and time, as is generally true of the elements of society and culture.” 515
Moreover, in this country the vast majority of people identify as middle class, even
if they are economically at the far ends of the spectrum, making it hard to organize
on the basis of shared economic status.
At the same time, the very nuance required to understand class and its
relationship to race, gender, and other identities can make it hard to generate a
movement. 516 Perhaps for this reason, Occupy Wall Street identified a 99% with a
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shared interest in greater distribution of resources, without emphasizing the
immense variances between and among the 99%. For instance, a professional in
the top 10% has a far different life experience than an individual who is homeless
because he recently lost his job. Not surprisingly then, Occupy Wall Street did not
generate its own political movement; its base of support was extremely diffuse. A
social-justice movement dedicated to legal change needs to mobilize multiple
constituencies, while recognizing shared interests and marked differences. 517
4. Multidimensional Strategies
As lawyers in both progressive and conservative social-change movements
know well, litigation is not the only way to reform law or even the best way.
Rather, there are multiple tools for effectuating systemic change, including
community organizing, 518 legislative and administrative advocacy, civil disobedience, public education, 519 and community education. 520 Indeed, the Occupy
Wall Street movement combined elements of organizing, protest, media attention,
and social-media activism. While it did not attempt to change law directly, Occupy
Wall Street altered public and political dialogue, and probably helped lay the
groundwork for the fiscal cliff deal reached by President Obama and Congress in
early 2013, a central piece of which was higher taxes for top earners. Notably,
Occupy Wall Street was not a rights-based movement; it focused on a societal
critique rather than affirmative claims.
Lawyers who advocate for social reform disagree over the utility of rightsbased strategies. On the one hand, the major social-justice movements in the 1960s
and 1970s, such as the fight for civil rights and gender equality, were focused on
attaining rights for subordinated people and relied on the persuasive power of
rights-based discourse and the legal power of rights-based claims. As Professor
debates between Iris Marion Young, who defends identity-based politics, and Nancy Fraser,
who argues for a greater focus on material deprivations).
517
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coordinating the strategic deployment of community resources to achieve communitydefined goals, and building community-based democratic organizations led by local leaders
who advocate for social and economic change”).
519
Professor Gary Blasi argues that advocates who serve the homeless effectively
educated the public about the causes of homelessness, such that the public now accepts that
homelessness is rooted in structural, rather than individual, causes. Gary Blasi, Advocacy
and Attribution: Shaping and Responding to Perceptions of the Causes of Homelessness,
19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 207, 220–22, 234 (2000).
520
Community legal education is “a form of systemic advocacy that aims to educate a
segment of the community about its rights in a particular legal context to advance the
empowerment of that community.” Margaret Martin Barry et al., Teaching Social Justice
Lawyering: Systematically Including Community Legal Education in Law School Clinics,
18 CLINICAL L. REV. 401, 404 (2012).
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Martha Minow has stated, rights rhetoric “enables a devastating, if rhetorical,
exposure of and challenge to hierarchies of power.” 521 On the other hand, rights
have been critiqued for failing to achieve transformative change in political and
social structures and for individualizing and masking collective forms of
oppression. 522 Professor Marc Tushnet contends that “social circumstances,” rather
than court-based rules, actually change outcomes. 523 Moreover, people who
already hold power in society sometimes co-opt newly recognized rights. 524
This dichotomy is mirrored in the debates over whether litigation or other
forms of advocacy can better achieve social justice. 525 Litigation is credited for
changing “many aspects of the social, political, and economic landscape,” 526 such
as the decision in Roe v. Wade, 527 establishing a right to abortions, or the decision
in Brown v. Board of Education, striking down separate but equal schools. 528
521

Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J.
1860, 1910 (1987); see also Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal
Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 305 (1987)
(“Rights do, at times, give pause to those who would otherwise oppress us; without the
law’s sanction, these individuals would be more likely to express racist sentiments on the
job. It is condescending and misguided to assume that the enervating effect of rights talk is
experienced by the victims and not the perpetrators of racial mistreatment.” (footnote
omitted)); Francesca Polletta, The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern
Civil Rights Organizing, 1961–1966, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 367, 377 (2000) (stating rights
“can mobilize people by casting grievances as legitimate entitlements and by fostering a
sense of collective identity”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics:
Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 598 (1986) (stating
rights discourse “can help to affirm human values, enhance political growth, and assist in
the development of collective identity”); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes:
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 430
(1987) (describing how black Americans “nurtured rights and gave rights life”).
522
See Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism,
32 UCLA L. REV. 474, 595–96 (1985); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from
Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699, 757 (1988) (noting the “oftobserved risk that litigation will co-opt social mobilization”); see also Schneider, supra
note 521, at 593–99 (summarizing the critical legal studies critique of rights).
523
Marc Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 S.M.U. L. REV. 23, 32–33 (1993).
524
See Sharon K. Hom & Eric K. Yamamoto, Collective Memory, History, and Social
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1752 (2000) (“[T]his progressive civil rights legacy has
been undermined by conservative political backlash and rhetorical appropriation of rights
language and its moral claims.”); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Remedy: UnderRuling Civil Rights in Walker v. City of Mesquite, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1309, 1352–54
(2000).
525
While there are many conceptions of social justice, Iris Marion Young helpfully
defines it as “the elimination of institutionalized domination and oppression.” IRIS MARION
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 15 (1990).
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Cummings & Eagly, supra note 501, at 491.
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410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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See Nan D. Hunter, Response, Lawyering for Social Justice, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1009, 1013 (1997). Cf. Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law
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Sometimes, creative litigation can be used to unmask existing power structures, 529
and even when litigation fails, it can still reshape public dialogue and opinion and
generate leverage for alternate solutions.530 Yet, litigation can also breed a sense of
powerlessness in ordinary people, as it is a world dominated by privileged
experts. 531 Litigation does not help people “gain control of the forces which affect
their lives,” 532 as it forces people to voice their aspirations in terms cognizable by
courts. 533 This critique has led to new forms of community-based lawyering in
which “[a]ttorneys appear as supporting players rather than main characters,
seeking to help organizations build the power needed to achieve their goals.” 534 In
this capacity, a lawyer can hold many roles—“litigator and litigation analyst,
transactional lawyer, political strategist, negotiator, community educator, broker,
writer, lobbyist, and staff member.” 535 As part of this nonhierarchical relationship,
clients “are transformed through the process of struggle by learning about, and
participating in, a decision that will fundamentally affect their quality of life.” 536
Suffice to say, in developing strategies for obtaining economic equality, there
is space for all these models and strategies. Just as the causes of economic equality
are complex, strategies to achieve equality need to be equally multifaceted and
to Make Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 991 (1997) (arguing that legislative reform
can be more “culture shifting” than judicial reform).
529
Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 375–76 (1983)
(“[T]he lawyer should always attempt to reshape the way legal conflicts are represented in
the law, revealing the limiting character of legal ideology and bringing out the true
socioeconomic and political foundations of legal disputes.”).
530
See Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer is Not the Protagonist: Community Campaigns,
Law, and Social Change, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2133, 2141 (2007) (“These lawyers measure the
success of their work in relation to how much power the groups develop and how much
closer it brings them to achieving their vision.”); White, supra note 522, at 758–59 (In
some situations, litigation “widens the public imagination about right and wrong, mobilizes
political action behind new social arrangements, or pressures those in power to make
concessions.”).
531
See Steve Bachmann, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?,
19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 391, 391–92 (1992) (book review).
532
William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for
Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455, 455–56 (1995).
533
See Virginia P. Coto, LUCHA, The Struggle for Life: Legal Services for Battered
Immigrant Women, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 749, 753 (1999) (“The lawyer for poor
individuals is likely, whether he wins cases or not, to leave his clients precisely where he
found them, except that they will have developed a dependency on his skills to smooth out
the roughest spots in their lives.”); White, supra note 522, at 757.
534
Gordon, supra note 530, at 2133; White, supra note 522, at 764 (“The role of the
lawyer is to help the group learn a method of deliberation that will lead to effective and
responsible strategic action.”).
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Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political
Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1999, 2057–58 (2007).
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LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 14–15 (2001).
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ongoing. For instance, the foreclosure crisis—a key ingredient of the Great
Recession and a focus of Occupy Wall Street protests—had many causes, requiring
multiple responses. Roots of the crisis included a rise in subprime and predatory
lending fueled by low interest rates; risk taking behavior by lenders and borrowers;
lender fraud; a burst in the housing market bubble that led to the rapid devaluation
of housing prices; an economic downturn that lead to financial hardship and
inability by some homeowners to pay mortgages; a lack of regulatory oversight of
the mortgage market and ratings agencies; and the collapse of the asset-backed
securitized mortgage market.537 Notably, the foreclosure crisis was fueled by and
magnified income inequality. 538 Social justice advocates have responded to this
crisis with a wide variety of tactics in the hopes of helping homeowners and
tenants remain in their homes. Lawyers have worked with community groups to
educate homeowners about their rights. 539 Lawyers have filed class actions
challenging a wide array of discriminatory, unfair, and misleading lending
practices. 540 Lawyers have represented individuals in court and in new forums of
alternative dispute resolution. 541 Lawyers have provided federal policymakers with
recommendations based on their on-the-ground perspectives. 542 Lawyers have
moved legislatures to enact new protections and processes to govern the
foreclosure process. 543 While litigation has been a piece of the response to the
537

U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ROOT
CAUSES OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS vii–xi (2010), available at http://www.huduser.org/P
ublications/PDF/Foreclosure_09.pdf (summarizing the literature on the crisis).
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Raymond H. Brescia, The Cost of Inequality: Social Distance, Predatory Conduct,
and the Financial Crisis, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 641, 643 (2011) (arguing that
income and racial inequality created social distance that lead to predatory conduct). Brescia
notes that the greater the income inequality in a state, the greater the rate of mortgage
delinquencies. Id. at 644.
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See Nicholas Hartigan, No One Leaves: Community Mobilization as a Response to
the Foreclosure Crisis in Massachusetts, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 181, 197–99 (2010)
(describing how lawyers and community groups came together to canvass every home
facing foreclosure to educate homeowners about their rights).
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See Raymond H. Brescia, Tainted Loans: The Value of a Mass Torts Approach in
Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 23–29 (2009) (describing various
forms of litigation against lenders for misconduct); see generally Gary Klein & Shennan
Kavanagh, Causes of the Subprime Foreclosure Crisis and the Availability of Class Action
Responses, 2 NORTHEASTERN U. L.J. 137 (2010) (discussing recent class actions).
541
See Lydia Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a
Securitized Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1889, 1908–15 (2013) (discussing the
increased use of procedures for alternative dispute resolution to mitigate the harms of the
foreclosure crisis); see generally Janet Stidman Eveleth, Foreclosure Crisis: Volunteer
Lawyers Help Homeowners, 42 MD. BAR J. 50 (2009) (describing a pro bono project in
Maryland to help those affected by the foreclosure crisis).
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Robin S. Golden, Building Policy Through Collaborative Deliberation: A
Reflection on Using Lessons from Practice to Inform Responses to the Mortgage
Foreclosure Crisis, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 733, 737 (2011).
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foreclosure crisis, it has only been one part of a broad-based movement to preserve
housing. Likewise, other areas of economic inequality will require similarly broadbased, creative, and coordinated approaches.
5. Access to Justice
Of course, the Supreme Court is not the entire story of how law reinforces
inequality. The judicial branch encompasses federal, state, and administrative
courts, and these fora have much greater day-to-day contact with the 99%. Indeed,
most Americans have contact with the judicial branch through lower-level district
courts when they owe a debt, are part of a dissolving family, or are accused of
committing a crime. Yet, there is no right to civil legal counsel, and as a result,
“the market controls the distribution, availability, and quality of legal services.” 544
The market outcome is grim. Fewer than one in five low-income people have
access to a lawyer for their civil legal problems, 545 while only two to three-fifths of
middle-income Americans can afford civil legal help. 546 Fewer than 1% of the
nation’s total legal expenditures go to the bottom seventh of Americans who
qualify for legal aid, 547 and thus, poor litigants are left to fend for themselves pro
se. Moreover, the fora where these low-income citizens often appear have none of
the trappings of the Supreme Court. On the one hand, harried judges may be
presiding over hundreds of cases in a single day; on the other hand, administrative
law judges may take months to process even basic claims for benefits. 548 With
regard to criminal justice systems, the vast majority of criminal defendants are
indigent. 549 While they have a formal right to counsel, this right is illusory given
that 90% of defendants plead out with no factual investigation on their case,
largely because public defenders are grossly overworked and underpaid. 550
This lack of equal access to justice compounds economic inequality for those
who cannot afford lawyers, experts, and other accoutrement of modern day
The Foreclosure Crisis and Its Impact on Tenants, NAT’L HOUSING L. PROJECT, http://nhl
p.org/foreclosureandtenants/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (describing new federal and state
laws designed to protect tenants who live in homes going through foreclosure).
544
Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 100 (2005).
545
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 1 (2009), available at
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_
2009.pdf.
546
DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004).
547
Id. at 7; Rubinson, supra note 544, at 103.
548
See Rubinson, supra note 544, at 109–16 (describing the staggering caseloads of
judges and administrative law judges).
549
RHODE, supra note 546, at 11 (“In criminal cases, over three-quarters of
defendants facing felony charges are poor enough to qualify for court-appointed counsel.”).
550
See id. at 4 (“Fewer than 1[%] of lawyers are in legal aid practice, which works out
to about one lawyer for every 1,400 poor or near-poor persons in the United States.”);
Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1126 (2006).
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litigation. As Professor Deborah Rhode says, “[w]e tolerate a system in which
money often matters more than merit, and equal protection principles are routinely
subverted in practice.” 551 Thus, any progressive movement aimed at reducing
income inequality needs to consider reforms of the entire judicial system and to
strategize around ways to give voice and fair process to the 99%. Professor Robert
Rubinson identifies proposals that work within existing frameworks, such as
expansions of pro bono programs, enhanced government spending on legal
representation for the poor, and a right to counsel in civil cases. 552 Further, he
suggests reforms that are more transformative and that break the reliance on
lawyers to achieve justice, such as evolving models of alternative dispute
resolution and community lawyering, in which lawyers help communities reach
their self-defined goals through organizing, lobbying, and transactional law. 553
These multidimensional approaches may not only hold greater promise for
expanding access to justice, but also for achieving justice.
CONCLUSION
The Occupy Wall Street protests in 2011 focused public attention on
economic inequality, as well as the role of government policies in contributing to
economic inequality. The invisible or impartial hand of the marketplace does not
cause economic inequality. Rather, the marketplace exists and operates within a
framework established by government. President Obama amplified the themes of
Occupy Wall Street, calling economic equality the “defining issue of our time,” in
his 2012 State of the Union Address. 554 In line with this theme, Obama supported
the 2009 stimulus legislation, health care coverage for the uninsured in the
Affordable Care Act, and he repeatedly called on the 1% to pay their share of the
nation’s tax bill. 555 After winning re-election, in 2013 his State of the Union
featured several additional proposals to reduce economic inequality, such as a rise
in the minimum wage and universal preschool. In his 2014 State of the Union,
President Obama again addressed inequality, which “has deepened,” and he
accordingly pushed ideas such as stricter enforcement of equal pay laws for
women, an expansion of unemployment insurance, and a higher minimum wage. 556
Laws and measures such as these recognize the role of government in both creating
551
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and ameliorating economic inequality. Nevertheless, the judicial branch is rarely
part of the narrative of economic inequality, despite its significant impact.
The Supreme Court reinforces economic inequality by selectively employing
deference to legislative judgments. When legislatures act to level the playing field,
the Court generally abandons deference, such as with voluntary desegregation
plans, consumer protection and employment statutes, and campaign finance laws.
By contrast, when legislatures pass laws that engender economic inequality, the
Court is happy to defer, such as with school financing laws, voter identification
requirements, and punitive social welfare policies. Either way, the 99% do not win.
Thus, any social movement for economic equality needs to consider the impact of
the judiciary and its potential for reforming law. Extreme levels of economic
inequality harm our entire society. To succeed as a nation, we need laws and a
judiciary that serves us all—the full 100%.

